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The Diplomacy of In 
The ABC Conference 
Niagara Falls, 1914
In 1914, after t Unite-
at the Mexican port of Veracruz, Argentina, Brazil, 
and Chile (the ABC Nations) offered to mediate the 
dispute between American president Woodrow Wilson and 
Mexican leader Victoriano Huerta. The subsequent 
conference, held in Niagara Falls, Canada, is the 
subject of this thesis.
By using primary sources, the edited papers of 
Woodrow Wilson, edited documentary history of the 
Mexican Revolution, records of the Department of 
State and numerous contemporary articles and many 
secondary sources, the conclusion was reached that 
the conference failed.
The great irony of the Conference also reveals why 
it failed: during the Conference, the ABC nations
also attempted to intervene in Mexican internal 
affairs. The Conference tried to dictate social and 
political reform to the Mexican people. This intent 
flawed the mediation and doomed any success.
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INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1913, President Woodrow Wilson told
British Minister Sir William Tyrrell, "I am going to teach 
the South American republics to elect good men!”  ̂ Arrogant 
by most standards, Wilson’s phrase typified a coherent and 
consistent theme of the President’s foreign policy. He 
continually believed in the power of democratic institu­
tions— i.e. given the right training, any people could share 
in the fruits of democracy and freedom. These idealistic and 
moral beliefs sometimes clashed with reality. One clear
instance of this occurred after the United States invasion of 
Veracruz, Mexico, in 1914. Wilson interfered there to 
ameliorate Mexico’s problems, and force the Mexicans to
accept a more democratic form of government.
Rather than clarifying the Mexican situation, Wilson’s 
occupation only confused issues. Not only did the Huerta 
government denounce the invasion, but the Mexican Constitu­
tionalist insurgents, whom Wilson ostensibly aided, also
rejected the American action.
1 Cited in Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor, Woodrow 
Wilson and the Invasion of Veracruz (New York: W. W, Norton
and Co. Inc., 1962), p. 2.
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Into this milieu stepped Argentina, Brasil, and Chile
(the ABC nations) offering their good offices to mediate the
dispute. All the parties, Wilsonian, huertista, and Ccnsti-
2tutionalist, accepted the offer in principle. Although the
Conference <20 May - 2 July 1914) drafted protocols to solve 
the problems, none of the agreements were implemented; 
consequently the conference failed. The questions then 
arise: What did the Conference attempt; and why did it fail?
The mediators were also diplomatic emissaries, and 
responded to the Mexican situtation in relation to their own 
national situations. To a degree, the Conference displayed 
some of the national prejudices of the ABC nations toward the 
Revolution. As well, each of the participants brought 
different personal perspectives to the Conferences. These 
viewpoints shed light on the Conference understanding or 
misunderstanding of the Mexican Revolution. To what degree 
were these national and personal views responsible for the 
Conference’s ineffectualness?
As well, the Conference brought into play the inevitable 
conflicts between personal itites and ideas. Each nation and 
faction brought its own peculiar biases and perspectives to 
the Conference, and these, as much as any idealized prin­
ciple, ultimately affected the course that mediation would 
take.
2 For background, see Michael C, Meyer and William 
L. Sherman, The Course of Mexican History, second edition 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 483-525.
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The Conference acted on the principle of international 
mediation and arbitration. It tried to negotiate the United 
States out of Veracruz. In participating, the United States 
placed itself on a par with the Latin American nations. 
Since the Conference failed in the mediation attempt, did 
this indicate limitations to the principle of arbitration?
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile approached the Conference
from the perspective of broadening Latin American participa­
tion in the settlement of hemispheric disputes. Yet, 
from within each set of national objectives, emerged a
real fear of mass social revolution. Gradualist reformers in 
each of the ABC nations feared that violent social outbursts 
could leave them as devastated as Mexico. Argentina,
moreover, resented the domineering presence of the United
States and hoped to use the Conference to neutralize the
Monroe Doctrine, thereby hampering unilateral action by the 
United States.
Vhile the United States had been depicted as the 
principal interventor in the hemisphere, the Niagara Confer­
ence clearly indicated the degree to which the ABC powers 
were willing to intervene in the internal affairs of a sister 
republic. Reform measures championed by both the United
States and the ABC countries indicated that they had come
together to do more than settle the Veracruz dispute between 
Woodrow Wilson and Victoriano Huerta, Yet none of the 
conferees wanted to accept the reality of social revolution
vii
in Mexico. They tried and failed to unite a Mexico torn by 
contending factions.
Hone of the countries, including the contentious Mexican 
representatives, really understood what was happening in 
Mexico. The explosion of social issues brought forth 
problems that the Conference participants either ignored or 
tried to resolve cosmetically. In so doing, Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, and the United States, knowingly or unknow­
ingly, intervened in Mexican affairs.
In compiling the information for this thesis, I made 
extensive use of archival sources of the United States 
Department of State, both in microfilm and published form. I 
also used many contemporary journal articles and the New York 
Times. For a Mexican perspective I used two works by Isidoro 
Fabela— Venustiano Carranza’s Foreign Minister--his Documen- 
tos histdricos and Historia diplomatica. Although somewhat 
colored, they provide a remedy to an over1y-nationalist 
view. Additionally, I consulted numerous secondary sources.
Methodologically, the most difficult aspect of the 
thesis stemmed from the scarcity of conference records. 
Neither the mediators nor the participants kept minutes of 
the meetings. The only official documentation regarding the 
Conference exists in the four protocols which contain only 
the conclusions of the plenary sessions. Consequently the 
exact nature of the various diplomatic meetings and inter—  
views had to be gleaned through the dispatches sent to the
Department of State from the United States representatives, 
materials sent to the Mexican Foreign Ministery, collected in 
Fabela’s works, and contemporary analysis from newspapers and 
j ournals.
CHAPTER ONE
THE DIPLOMATIC DILEMMA
Admiral Frank F. Fletcher, commanding the battleships
Utah and Florida, received an ominous message on 21 April
1914. United States Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels,
sent him orders: "Seize customshouse Cat Veracruz]. Do not
permit war supplies to be delivered to [the] Huerta govern-
1ment or any other party.”
As part of increased pressure by the United States on 
Victoriano Huerta, Fletcher’s ships had stationed themselves 
off the eastern Mexican coast. His contingent consisted of 
787 officers and men, of whom 502 were Marines, Marine
Colonel V. C. Neville led the occupation force, which
originally planned only to take the waterfront area. Mexican 
civilians and resident Americans lined the sea wall to 
watch. All too rapidly, the Mexicans realized the signifi­
cance of this landing. As United States military personnel
1 Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor, Woodrow Wilson
and the Invasion of Veracruz (New York: V, W. Norton and Co, ,
Inc., 1967) p. 85. Hereafter referred to as Quirk, Honor, 
page numbei'.
moved toward the customshouse, Mexican soldiers opened fire. 
Many of the Marines and sailors had never faced combat before 
and even though they followed textbook tactics, they moved 
carelessly. The tightly bunched men presented fine targets 
for the rifles of Mexican snipers and federales. Fortunately 
the Mexicans, like the U.S. forces, lacked experience and 
suffered from poor marksmanship. Lucky Mexican bullets 
killed four U.S. Marines and wounded another twenty. The 
panicked U.S. farces retaliated bitterly and viciously.
A second group of Marines with Philippine battle 
experience moved precisely through the city blocks, forcing 
their way into houses to secure the town, including the 
customshouse. Simultaneously the battleships New Hampshire, 
South Carolina, and Vermont steamed in to protect the 
American flank. On request from the landing force, the 
escort ships Prairie, Chester, and San Francisco lobbed 
support rounds into the city. In slightly less than twenty- 
four hours, U. S. forces had defeated the Mexican detachment 
(slightly more than 100 men), inflicting uncounted damage to 
civilian property.
From the U.S. perspective, ample provocation existed for 
the Veracruz invasion. President Woodrow Wilson cited 
several incidents to justify the action. The most important 
conflict occurred on 9 April, when seven American sailors and 
the payroll officer at Tampico were arrested by Mexican 
soldiers.
Huerta's federales in Tampico bad faced attack by 
Constitutionalist forces in the surrounding area, To 
conserve battle supplies, the Mexican forces refused to sell 
any gasoline to a group of American servicemen needing 
to fuel their launch in order to return to their ship. 
Although the Mexicans refused, a German businessman offered 
to sell some of his extra petrol to the Americans. As the 
sailors walked from the launch along the wharf, Mexican 
police became curious about the Americans who spoke no 
Spanish. The Mexican military police did not understand what 
the American force wanted and arrested them. The Mexican 
military governor, realizing the mistake, apologized pro­
fusely to the Americans. The apology, however, failed to 
placate Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, commander of the United 
States fleet off Tampico. On his own initiative, Mayo 
demanded a full apology to the United States and a twenty- 
one gun salute. The Mexicans refused, since the United 
States had not recognized Huerta. The Mexican government 
countered with an offer to fire a simultaneous salute, but 
neither side could agree on the terms which would solve the 
diplomatic impasse. Consequently, suspicions festered on 
both sides.
Furthermore, Wilson also drew attention to the 11 
April delay of a State Department dispatch from Mexico City, 
and the detention of a courier from Veracruz, Neither 
activity particularly surprised observers in light of
Mexico’s civil war. Following the Tampico incident, these
two episodes provided Wilson with minimal justification for
2the Veracruz landing.
Although drastic, the occupation of Veracruz crowned the 
already deteriorating relations with Mexico’s de facto 
President, Victoriano Huerta. The real root of the problem 
lay several years earlier, with the 1910 Mexican Revolution.
Prior to the Revolution, Porfirio Diaz had ruled 
Mexico. During his long dictatorship <1876-1910), Diaz tried 
to make Mexico into a great nation. He brought stability to 
the nation using the Positive Doctrine of order and pro­
gress. He created a system of rural policemen to eliminate 
brigandage, as well as formulating tough fiscal policies for 
the Mexican economy and streamlining the federal government. 
The early Diaz years brought positive changes to Mexico.
As Diaz’ tenure continued, he brought greater economic 
regeneration. His plan focused on enticing foreign compan­
ies to invest in and develop Mexico. The Diaz government
lowered or eliminated tariffs and shifted to the gold
standard. Diaz built a good reputation for Mexico’s economy, 
which paid handsome dividends. to investors in such enter—  
prises as mining, the railroads, and oil. To encourage
2 For more information on the background see Quirk, 
Honor; Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Hew 
York: Atheneum, 1971), hereafter referred to as Cline,
U.S. and Mexico, page number; James M. Callahan, American
Foreign Policy in Mexican Eelations (New York: MacMillan
Co, , 1932), hereafter referred to as Callahan, American
Policy, page number.
further investment, Diaz revised tax and mining codes 
to benefit foreigners.
Mexican society paid a high price for these programs. 
Modernization often came by force. As the principally 
foreign-controlled railroads and extractive industries 
needed land, the Diaz government frequently pushed the peons 
out of the area, since they could rarely produce a title. 
Mexican laborers were paid less than foreign counterparts 
and foreigners held most managerial and technical positions, 
regardless of the qualifications of the native labor force. 
The inequity in industry led the Mexican workers at the 
Cananea Consolidated Copper Company, owned by Colonel William 
Greene, to strike in 1906. When the strike threatened to 
shut down operations completely, a detachment of Diaz’ rural 
police arrived to reinstate order under Colonel Emilio 
Kosterlitzky. The military rounded up the strike leaders, 
escorted them outside the town, and hanged them. Although 
the strike occurred in 1906, it represented a growing 
restlessness on the part of the Mexican labor force.
While most of the older generation continued to support 
the Diaz regime, a new group of critics voiced their com­
plaints in the early twentieth century. The Diaz regime 
generally succeeded in silencing its critics, who frequently 
fled to the United States. The most important of the social 
critics were the Flores Mag6n brothers who published the
anti-Diaz newspaper, La Regeneracion. Although they settled 
in St. Louis, they continued publishing their newspaper.
In the summer of 1906, the Flores Magon brothers, with
the support of Francisco I. Madero, published its Liberal
Plan and farmed the Partido Liberal Mexicano (the PLM or 
Mexican Liberal Party). This political manifesto called for 
the implementation of the 1857 constitution and added a 
section dealing with social reforms: abolition of the death
penalty, educational reform favoring the poor, an eight-hour 
work day and a six-day work week, abolition of company
stores, and child labor. Also, to aid farmers, the govern­
ment would redistribute uncultivated land to the peasants and 
establish an agricultural credit bank.
The anti-Diaz forces had found a leader in Madero. Born 
in 1873 in the state of Coahuila, Madero had received the 
best education available. Madero’s family had made a fortune 
in banking, cattle, mining, and land speculation. After a 
tour abroad and to California to finish his education, Madera 
took charge of some of the family’s haciendas where he 
developed an interest in the welfare of the peons.
To improve the lot of the peasants, Madero ran against 
members of the Diaz regime for positions in the state 
government. Although Madero won some elections, the Diaz 
government overturned the victories, replacing him with its 
own candidate. Madero concluded that the fundamental
difficulty in the Mexican system lay in the self-perpetua­
tion of a non-responsive and non-representative government.
In 1909, Madero published his La Sucesion presidencial de
3
1910. This political tract founded the anti-reelection
platform. This movement concentrated on political reform and 
free and honest flections. Social reform would follow in a 
true democracy.
After a whirlwind campaign tour, Madero found himself in 
a Diaz jail cell at election time. Consequently, Diaz’
electoral victory came as no surprise to the Mexican popu­
lace. Madero gained his freedom and moved to the United 
States, where he platted his return. Madero’s Plan de San 
Luis Potosi, published on 5 October 1910 from San Antonio,
Texas, called for the nullification of the election and 
overthrow of the Diaz regime. Rebel armies quickly appeared
in response to Madero’s call. These armies, frequently
little more than guerrilla bands, harried federal troops. 
Only in the northern state of Chihuahua did any major battles 
occur. In May 1911, the rebels captured the town of Ciudad 
Juarez. With this success, the insurgents redoubled their 
efforts, fanned out from Chihuahua, and gained control of
Tehuac&n, Durango, Cananea, and Torre6n. The press became 
increasingly critical and federal army troops deserted the 
demoralized regime.
3 The first edition of this was published in 1908.
Madero revised the 1909 version to attract Zapata and his 
followers, who had already rebelled against the Diaz regime.
Diaz, yielding to the situation, . sent a negotiation 
team to Ciudad Juarez to deal with Madero. The treaty
provided that Diaz and his vice-president Ramon Corral would 
resign before the end of the month. Diaz submitted his
resignation to the Congress on 25 May 1910.
When Diaz fled Mexico for Europe, he reputedly remarked
that Madero had unleashed a tiger, ’’now let’s see if he can 
4control it.” Madero’s less-than-homogeneous supporters
splintered into factions. Each group asserted its view
vis a vis the composition of the new government, Madero 
faced rebellions, potential and real, on several fronts.
To begin, Emiliano Zapata stood out as a primary
antagonist. In fact he had not completely supported the Plan 
de San Luis de Potosl. Zapata correctly felt that Madero was 
more concerned with political reform than with agrarian
reform. In November of 1911, the zapatistas issued their own 
Plan de Ayala. It condemned the social system which led to 
economic hardships for the peasant majority. With the Plan, 
Madero faced an armed rebellion, which quickly spread from 
Zapata’s native Morelos to the neighboring states of Guer­
rero, Tlaxcala, Puebla, and even to the Federal District 
itself.^
4 Cited in Michael Meyer and William L. Sherman, The 
Course of Mexican History, second edition (New York; Oxford 
University Press, 1983) p. 511, hereafter cited as Meyer and 
Sherman, Mexican History, page number,
5 Meyer and Sherman, Mexican History, p. 511-534.
In the north, General Bernardo Reyes mobilized a force 
against Madero. Reyes had opposed Madero’s presidential 
candidacy. Reyes had little success in recruiting men. He 
surrendered to the federal army shortly afterward.^
Pascual Orozco contributed further resistance in Chihua­
hua. He issued his own plan in March 1912, calling for 
extensive social reform, a ten-hour work day, higher wages, 
restrictions on child labor, and nationalization of the rail­
roads. Orozco’s movement truly threatened Madero. But the 
President found a good field commander in General Victoriano 
Huerta. Huerta was the son of an Indian mother and a Mestizo 
father. Born in the state of Jalisco, Huerta had little more 
than a rudimentary elementary education. Influential friends 
saw him into the national Military Academy where he graduated 
near the top of his class and was commissioned in 1876.
During the Porfiriato, Huerta fought against the Yaqui 
and Maya, enforcing Diaz’ peace. Gaining success on the 
battlefield, Huerta rose rapidly, becoming a brigadier 
general. He first received national attention when he forced 
demobilization of the zapatistas after Madera’s victory. 
Huerta pushed the orozquistas north, temporarily saving the 
regime.
Just as Madero subdued one rebellion, another took its 
place. F§lix Diaz, the nephew of Porfirio Diaz, called upon
Ibid. See also Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolu­
tion: Genesis under Madero (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1968) for more background,
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counter-revolutionaries to support him in Veracruz. Although
Diaz controlled the Veracruz garrison, he had little support
from other areas. Within a month, Diaz and his followers
were isolated and captured by federal troops. With F§lix
Diaz and Bernardo Reyes imprisoned, Mexico enjoyed a lull in
the turmoil, only to be disrupted by a military coup plotted
by Reyes and Diaz and led by the pro-Diaz General Manuel 
7Mondragfin.
On 9 February 1913, Mondragon arranged the release of 
Diaz and Reyes from Mexico City prisons. For the next ten 
days, the Decena Tragica turned the capital into a battle 
zone. To defend his section of Mexico City, Madero appointed 
General Huerta to command his troops. By 17 February 1913, 
the fighting in Mexico City reached a stalemate. The next 
day, Huerta betrayed President Madero. Henry Lane Wilson, 
the United States Ambassador, conducted meetings which
brought Huerta into the rebel fold. Wilson believed himself 
to be the protector of U.S. business interests. Citing the 
damage done to foreign property, he rejected Madera and 
worked hard to unite FSlix Diaz and Huerta. His work bore
fruit when Huerta joined the insurgents in the "pact of the 
Embassy.” Huerta imprisoned Madero, his Vice-President, 
Jose Marla Pino Suarez, and the cabinet. Huerta assumed
power after securing the resignations of both the president 
and vice president. On 22 February, as Madero and Pino
7 Ibid, p. 519.
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Suarez travelled under federal escort from the National 
Palace to the Federal District Penitentiary, they were 
murdered under confusing and suspicious circumstances. The 
Huerta government announced the improbable tale that a group 
of maderistas attacked the convoy. Who killed Madero and
Pino Suarez remains uncertain, but many contemporary obser­
vers, including President Woodrow Wilson, believed Huerta
Qordered the assassination.
Huerta’s assumption of power did not go unchallenged.
Coahuila Governor Venustiano Carranza, a maderista, refused
to accept Huerta’s rule. Finding support in the northern
states of Sonora and Chihuahua, Carranza issued the Plan de
Guadalupe. This Plan named Carranza ’’First Chief” of the
Constitutionalist Army and declared a war to the end against
Huerta and the Federales. Emiliano Zapata also pursued a
separate campaign against the Huerta regime, seeking the
9restitution of lands for his southern peasant supporters.
Huerta, facing twin rebellions, needed revenue to 
continue the struggle. Because of widespread Mexican
militarization, agricultural centers withered. This drama­
tically reduced logistical support for armies and reduced the 
federal tax base. Consequently port revenues and internation­
al loans played key roles in waging a successful campaign.
O
Quirk, Honor, p. 37.
9 Meyer and Sherman, Mexican History, p. 524.
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To obtain foreign loans, however, Huerta needed the diploma-
10tic recognition of the United States.
Ambassaldor Henry Lane Wilson recommended recognition, as 
did much of the American business community in Mexico. Yet 
President Wi Ison'decided on a ’’wait-and-see” attitude. Dis­
trusting State Department competence, Wilson sent his own 
’’special agents” to Mexico to get information on the Mexican 
situation. Alarmingly, most of these envoys spoke no Spanish 
and had little preparation for the task. Nevertheless, so 
long as they responded with sycophancy, the White House 
praised their efforts. Ambassador Wilson, outraged by such 
treatment, received his dismissal by summer, 1913. Charge
d ’Affairs Nelson 0 ’Shaunnessy assumed control of the embas- 
11sy.
Wilson’s obsessive concern with political ethics decided
the recognition issue. Wilson refused on moral grounds to
12recognize the Huerta government. State Department experts
argued that the United States had always extended de facto 
recognition to revolutionary governments. Yet Wilson ignored 
basic convention, holding to his position that mere adherence 
to the letter of a constitution, as Huerta had done, was 
insufficient. In essence, he created a test of "consti-
10 Ibid, p. 529.
11 Ibid.
12 Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive 
Era (lew York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 108-109,
hereafter referred to as Link, Progressive Era, page number.
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tutional legitimacy.” He tried to look behind the scenes to
determine moral and political legitimacy. This view preclu-
13ded any recognition for the Huerta regime.
In Wilson's view the Constitutionalists, led by Venus-
tiano Carranza, more legitimately represented the Mexican
people. Carranza was a fervent Madero supporter and served
as Governor of Coahuila under him. Although personally drab,
Carranza captured the attention of the northern states when
he announced his rejection of Huerta and issued a circular
telegram exhorting them to follow his example. To help them
achieve power the United States initially aided Carranza.
When the Constitutionalists encountered strong federal
opposition on the battlefield, Wilson cut off Huerta’s vital
supply route for money and war material with intervention at
14Veracruz. He hoped that this would topple Huerta.
Wilson expected popular support for American military
action and little resistance from the population of Veracruz.
Accordingly their spirited resistance shocked him. Both
Carranza and Huerta criticized their northern neighbor’s
15action as blatant intervention against Mexican sovereignty.
13 Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at
his Major Foreign Policies (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 
1957), p. 19.
Ibid.
15 Isidoro Fabela, Historia diplomatics de la Revolucion 
mexicana, Vol. II (Mexico DF: Fonda de Cultura Economica,
1959) p. 7; Link, Progressive Era, p. 113,
14
Wilson’s actions put the United States in an uncomfoi—
table position. The civil war in Mexico continued while, in
Washington, Congress criticized the President’s Mexican
policy. As one reporter noted, "The administration has a
policy, but no plan. It knows what it wants but not how to
get it.” Others spoke less kindly; "President Wilson is
proceeding without any chart or compass. Wilson, instead
17of clarifying matters, simply confused them.
On 24 April 1914, Wilson saw his opportunity to amelio­
rate the diplomatic imbroglio when the legation officers of 
Argentina and Chile, along with the Brazilian Ambassador (the 
ABC nations), offered their services to mediate between 
Mexico and the United States. He accepted the next day.
Five days later, in a circular telegram to all diplomatic 
missions, the State Department noted that all three parties—  
-Huerta, Wilson, and Carranza— accepted "the principle
of mediation. This enables the mediators to deal with the
1 0entire Mexican situation.”
1.0 Gregory Mason, "Mexico As Seen in Washington", 
Outlook, Vol. 107, 4 July 1914, p. 525, hereafter referred to 
as Mason, "Washington", page number.
17 Mason, "Washington", Outlook, p. 525; "Highway to 
Peace” , Outlook, Vol. 107, 30 May 1914, p. 104.
X 0 Isidoro Fabela, Documentos historicos de la Revolu- 
ci6n mexicana, Revoluci&n y Regimen Constitutionalista, Vol 
II (Mexico DF: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1962); Link,
Progressive Era, p. 126; United States Department of State, 
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1914 (Washington D.C. Government Printing Office, 
1922), Mediators to Secretary of State, 2 May 1914, File 
812.00/23425, hereafter referred to by Author, Recipient,
The nations in the American hemisphere held high regard
for the ideas of arbitration and mediation. The principle
of arbitration figured prominently at the First Pan-American
Conference in 1889. The conference covered trade relations,
customs unions, and arbitration. Consequently the idea of
19intei— American mediation won firm support.
The ABC nations had undergone mediation, both as 
arbitrators and disputants. Moreover, they had good rela­
tions with other nations. In entering mediation, the ABC
I
nations looked toward increasing their position regarding
20hemispheric relations.
The Argentines hoped to use mediation as a platform 
to air their views on inter-American relations. The Monroe 
Doctrine especially haunted them as a definite threat to 
their own prosperous relationship with Europe. Argentina 
feared that the United States would eventually expand over
date, file number, USDS, Foreign Relations; Chilean Charge 
d ’Affaire Fletcher to Secretary of State, 24 April 1914, File 
812.00/11683, USDS, Foreign Relations, p. 487; Buenos 
Aires Charge d ’Affaire Lorillard to Secretary of State, 27 
April 1914, File 812.00/11737, USDS, Foreign Relations, 
p. 471; Mediators to Secretary of State, 28 April 1914, File 
812.00/23494, USDS, Foreign Relations, p. 492; Secretary of 
State to Diplomatic Missions [circular telegrams], 29 April 
1914, File 812.00/117762, USDS, Foreign Relations, p. 494.
19 See Thomas F. McGann, Argentina, The United States 
and the Intel— American System 1880-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1957).
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all the Western Hemisphere. Mediation offered the Argentine
21Republic an opportunity to expand their influence.
Social change also convulsed Argentina. The 1912 Saenz
Peha law,, by allowing the middle and some of the lower
classes a greater say in political affairs, posed a greater
threat to the ruling oligarchy than did the Monroe Doctrine.
As in Mexico, the middle and lower classes wanted more
social and economic self-determination. To help suppress
their own social problems, it was in governmental interest to
22resolve the Mexican situation as painlessly as possible.
Although elitist, the ruling oligarchy noticed that 
stranger hemispheric relations seemed popular. Argen­
tina’s Francophilic-Anglophilic governing class eventually 
reconciled itself to a stranger Pan-American movement. While 
still distrusting the United States, Argentina accepted ’’the
Anglo-Saxon giant,” perhaps realizing that an ABC entente
23might offset the power of the North American nation.
An ABC alliance offered more relative security to Chile 
than to Argentina. Chile still harbored resentment toward 
the United States because of previous clashes. United States
21 Ibid-, see also Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States 
and The Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), hereafter
referred to as Whitaker, Southern Cone, page number.
2 2 Whitaker, Southern Cone, p. 76,
23 Ibid, p. 78,
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interference during the Chilean Civil War of 1891 almost 
brought the two nations to war.
The Chilean Civil War pitted President Jose Manuel 
Balmaceda and the army against the Chilean Congress and Navy. 
Although the United States did not directly intervene in 
the war, the Americans favored Balmaceda, Sea control gave
the fight to the Congress, thus minimizing the Executive
, 24role.
In the tense atmosphere, a barroom brawl between United 
States sailors and Chileans exploded into a raging battle. 
When the smoke cleared, two American sailors were dead. The 
’’Baltimore incident,” as it was referred to, prompted an 
international dispute threatening war. Heavy pressure from 
Washington forced the dismissal of the Chilean Foreign 
Minister and the Chilean Minister to the United States. With 
the removal of the irksome protagonists, the nations avoided 
war. Because Washington had forced Chile to recall its 
diplomats, "the Chilean people were left with the feeling 
that they had been humiliated by an arrogant American govern­
ment . ”
The Chilean government also faced social pressure 
regarding their relations with Argentina. During the last 
decades of the nineteenth century the Chilean economy passed 
from native to foreign control. Across the border, Chile
OCl“ For background on Chile see Henry Clay Evans, Chile 
and its Relations with the United States (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1927) and Whitaker, Southern Cone.
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contemplated the dismaying prospect of Argentine prosperity
and growth. The Chileans foresaw a bleak economic future.
This coupled with frequent border disputes threatened a
social disruption as potent as the earlier civil war.
Chile’s self interest dictated prevention of a powerful
25revolution in the Americas.
Though Chile and Argentina distrusted the United States,
Brazil sought its friendship. Brazil favored the Monroe
Doctrine, interpreting it to be a statement of protection for
26the self-determination of the Latin American nations.
Brazil’s Foreign Minister, Baron Rio Branco, focused 
his attention on close United States-Brazilian relations. 
The United States provided the single greatest market for the 
Brazilian economy’s (and hence the government’s) most 
important export, coffee. The Baron, realizing that the 
closer diplomatic relations could protect the coffee export 
from tariffs, sent Joaquim Nabuco, an ardent Americanist, to 
the United States. In 1905, his persistance in presenting
Brazil attractively bore fruit, as Mabuco became the first
Ambassador to the United States from any South American 
country.
25 Vhitaker, Southern Cone, p. 135.
26 For background see E. Bradford Burns, The Unwritten 
Alliance, Rio Branco and Brazilian-American Relations (Mew 
York: Columbia University Press, 1966) and Jose Maria Bello,
A History of Modern Brazil: 1889-1964 (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1966).
19
Rio Branco set out to make his nation a Latin American 
leader. He harnessed aggressive policies by using mediation 
and arbitration to settle border disputes. Brazil generally 
received favorable decisions, at the expense of Argentina, 
among others. Brazil set out to increase diplomatic ties 
with both the United States and Chile to counteract deterio­
rating relations with Argentina. In fact, Rio Branco first 
suggested an ABC entente by recommending a coordinated 
recognition of Panama. Through the efforts of the Baron, 
Brazil became increasingly important in international 
circles.
Although both Rio Branco and Nabuco died before the 
Veracruz incident, their successors, Lauro Mliller and 
Dominico Da Gama, successfully continued similar policies. 
Both able diplomats, they strengthened Brazilian leadership 
and United States relations.
lot all observers liked the idea of ABC mediation. One 
journal feared that the United States might become a scape­
goat for past indiscretions: ”of the ABC nations Brazil is
the only one which is really willing to favor the United
States. Both in Argentina and Chile there is a strong
27anti-Yankee feeling.” Others feared a possible pre-emptive
^  ’’ABC Plan as seen in Mexico” , Outlook, Vol 107, 30 
May 1914, p. 236.
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strike against the United States because of the privileged 
position the Americans had in the Mexican oil industry.
Regardless of ill feelings, the ABC powers forged ahead.
They expressed confidence in mediation as a peaceful 
solution to a crisis which threatened a war "whose carnage 
would only be comparable to the [United States] Civil War,” 
With such a background, the arbitrators and disputants 
prepared for a conference that would, they hoped, resolve a 
sanguinary civil dispute, uphold the principle of arbitra­
tion, and restore harmony to the hemisphere.
28 T.I bid.
CHAPTER TWO
’’PLAY BALL!”
With all the major participants: Carranza, Wilson, and
Huerta agreeing, at least "in principle” , to mediation, 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile looked forward to mediating the 
dispute, They planned to cover internal reforms, as well as 
the external dispute of the United States occupation of 
Veracruz which had precipitated mediation. Little did they 
realize the difficulties involved regarding the general 
armistice which they had taken for granted and the discussion 
of plans for internal reforms. Little bickering accompanied 
the selection of the site and organization of the 
conference. On 5 May 1914, the ABC envoys, Ambassador 
Dominico Da Gama, Legation Officer R6mulo Na6n, and Legation 
Officer Eduardo Suarez Mujica, made the decision for the 
conference site and scheduled its opening session on 20 May 
1914, The mediators chose Niagara because of its proximity 
to the disputants and because of its neutrality, although the 
Constitutionalists suspected that the mediators chose it to
21
reflect the financial ties between the Huerta government and
iGreat Britain.
Da Gama, "a man in the prime of life, with hair and 
mustache slightly tinged with grey,” represented Brazil. As 
Ambassador to the United States, he brought many years of 
diplomatic experience to Washington. He had first visited 
the United States in 1893 during arbitration over an Argen- 
tine-Brazilian border dispute. Since that early visit, Da 
Gama served in Europe on special missions, as Charge d ’Af­
fairs in Belgium, as Minister to Peru and Argentina, and 
finally, as Ambassador to the United States upon the death of 
Joaquim labuco. While Minister to Argentina, Da Gama served 
as vice-president of the 1908 Pan American Conference. As 
Brazilian Ambassador, he and his American wife ’’made the 
Brazilian Embassy a home to which invitations . . . [were] 
highly prized.” All who worked with Da Gama praised his
3astuteness and resourcefulness.
1 Fabela, Documentos, p. 41; United States Department of 
State, Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1914, Mediators to Secretary of State, 5 May 1914, 
File 812.00/11849, (Government printing office, Washington 
D.C., 1922), p. 497, hereafter referred to by author,
recipient, date, file number, Foreign Relations, page number.
2 Hamilton Holt, "Niagara Falls Mediation Conference” , 
The Independent, Vol. 78, 22 June 1914, p. 518, hereafter
referred to as Holt, "Niagara Falls” , page number.
3 George Hill, "Four Days of the Niagara Peace Confer­
ence” , The Independent, Vol. 78, 1 June 1914, p. 344,
hereafter referred to as Hill, "Four Days” , page number;
Holt, "Niagara Falls” , p, 518; E. Bradford Burns, The 
Unwritten A11iance (New York; Columbia University Press, 
1966), p. 51, hereafter referred to as Burns, Alliance, page
23
At thirty-nine years of age, Dr. R6mulo S. Na6n, 
representing Argentina, was the youngest of the mediators. 
He attended the Second Hague Conference in 1907. Some 
observers maintained that Na5n first suggested mediation 
between the United States and Mexico. Na6n previously held 
many important posts in the Argentine government. His 
proudest achievement before appointment to the United States 
Legation was the establishment of a school system for 
laborers while acting as Superintendent of Public Instruc­
tion. He came to the conference as an expert on interna­
tional law. ̂
Eduardo Su&rez MUjica, the representative from Chile, at 
70, was the oldest of the mediators. He was "tall, with an 
iron grey flowing beard and a military figure. In fact,” 
wrote Hamilton Holt, correspondent for The Independent, "he
5[had! the air of a Spanish grandee.” SuSrez Mftjica served 
Chile in a variety of posts— Assistant Minister of Foreign 
Relations, as a member of the national legislature, Secretary 
of Justice and Public Instruction, and as Minister to the 
United States since 1911. Before his assignment to Washing-
number. ; Review of Reviews (American), "The taking of Vera 
Cruz and what followed” , Vol. 49, June 1914, p. 671, here­
after referred to as Review, "Vera Cruz” , page number.
^ Hill, "Four Days” , p. 344; Review, "Vera Cruz” , p,
671.
5 Holt, "Niagara Falls” , p. 518.
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ton, Sulirez Mujica served as Minister to Mexico, making him 
the only mediator with direct experience there, though it 
ocurred before the Revolution.8
Da Gama presided at the conference because of his senior 
ambassadorial rank, though shortly before, the United States 
and Argentina raised their legations to embassy status, 
making laon an ambassador as well. Soon thereafter, Chile 
followed suit in exchanging ambassadors. 7
Emilio Rabasa, Augustin Rodriguez, and Luis Elguero rep­
resented Huerta. Rabasa and Rodriguez taught at the Free 
School of Law of Mexico. Rabasa specialized in international 
law, writing and lecturing extensively on the subject. 
Rodriguez practiced civil law. Elguero, a director of the 
National Bank and the National Railways of Mexico, represen­
ted the Mexican financial community; he also promoted the 
Agrarian Bank, designed "to enable thrifty peons to become
Qowners of their own farms,” Huerta’s representatives
8 Hill, "Four Days", p. 344; Review, "Vera Cruz” , p.
671.
7 "The Argentine-Brazil-Chile Mediation” , Bulletin of 
the Pan American Union, Vol. 39, (August 1914), p. 173, 
hereafter referred to as "ABC Mediation” , Bulletin, page 
number; Holt, "Niagara Falls” , p. 518.
8 Hill, "Four Days” , p. 344.
carried credentials which, giving them wide discretionary
9functions, amounted practically to plenary power,
Wilson sent Frederick E. Lehmann and Joseph Rucker Lamar
to represent the United States. Refusal of the United States
to recognize the Huerta government led to the appointment of
Lamar and Lehmann as ’’Special Commissioners of the President
of the United States near the Mediations.” Consequently,
although they attended the conference, they did not treat
with Huerta’s representatives and thus avoided implied
recognition. Lehmann, a man of great abilities, served as
president of the American Bar Association (1908-9) and
Solicitor General of the United States (1910-12). Lamar,
originally from Georgia, was a Federal Supreme Court Justice
10generally admired for his wide learning and culture.
While the Mexican delegates possessed wide discretionary 
ability, the United States representatives lacked such 
latitude. Lamar and Lehmann were to refer all information to 
either President Wilson or Secretary of State Bryan. To ease
9 New York Times, 20 May 1914; Consul Canada to
Secretary of State, 12 May 1914, 812.00/11914, Foreign
Relations, p. 499; Roberto Esteva Ruiz to Mediators, 4 May
1914, Fabela, Documentos, p. 40.
10 United States Department of State, Records of the
Department of State relating to the internal affairs of
Mexico, 1910-1929, Record group 59, National Archives, 
Secretary of State to President, 14 May 1914, file 812/2349B, 
hereafter referred to by author, recipient, date file number, 
RDS, RG59, NA; Arthur S. Link, ed, The Papers of Woodrow 
Wilson, Vol. 30, Woodrow Wilson to J.R. Lamar and Frederick 
Lehmann, 15 May 1914, p. 32, hereafter referred to as author, 
recipient, date, Link, Papers, page number; Holt, ’’Niagara 
Falls” , p. 519; New York Times, 20, 21 May 1914.
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communication, a special telephone connection linked the
United States representatives with the Vhite House and the
State Department, H. Percival Dodge, Secretary to the U. S.
delegation, State Department Attache Fred M. Rose, and
translator Jos€ M, Macias accompanied Lamar and Lehmann, ̂
Almost as soon as the conference began, critics raised
questions about mediation. Some suggested that the ABC
envoys were poorly prepared in their knowledge of Mexico.
Only Su&rez Mdj ica of the three mediators knew Mexico and he
dated his experience from the Diaz regime. How could the
envoys hope to solve Mexico’s problems without knowing how
Mexico had changed during the years of revolution? The
American delegation— although "intelligent and having common
sense"— also lacked Mexican expertise. Critics suggested
that the presence of a consular agent with recent Mexican
experience would lend strength to the U.S. representatives.
The mediators defended themselves, arguing that their
fairness depended on being impartial to the Mexican situation
and that their decisions would rest strictly on the material
12brought to them.
Secretary of State Bryan to Wilson, 19 May 1914, 
Link, Papers, p. 47; Wilson to Bryan, 20 May 1914, Ibid, 
p. 48.
12 Gregory Mason, "Mediation without information” , 
Outlook, Vol. 107, 27 June 1914, p. 445, hereafter reffered
to as Mason, "Information” , page numbers; New York Times, 21 
May 1914.
Most of the actual work of the conference occurred at 
the Clifton House, sometimes referred to as the Cliff House, 
on the Canadian side of Niagara Falls, where the mediators 
and Mexican delegates stayed. The Americans planned to stay 
at the International Hotel, but because of its closure, 
stayed at the Prospect House on the American side. The 
surroundings for the conference were pleasant. A nearby 
chapel, called the ’’Shrine of Peace” , seemed a good omen. 
The Cliff House management set aside several rooms on the 
main floor for the conference, including the solarium which 
provided a very relaxed atmosphere. The Cliff House, as the 
name implied, stood very close to the Falls— so close that 
with the windows open the mediators could feel the spray from 
the Falls.
On 20 May 1914, at 3:00 p.m., the conference began, with 
George Pearly, Canadian Secretary of State in the Canadian 
Cabinet, serving as host to the proceedings. All involved 
were present for the opening address by Ambassador Da Gama, 
save Suarez Mhjica, who had journeyed via Philadelphia, 
having forgotten the exact - date set for the opening of the 
conference.
In his opening speech, Da Gama laid out procedure:
13 New York Times, 20 May 1914; New York Times, 21 May 
1914; Fred Rose to Secretary of State Davis, 15 May 1914, 
file #812,00/23432, EDS, RG59, NA; Holt, ’’Niagara Falls” , 
p. 518; New York Times, 22 May 1914.
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1) The plenipotentiaries of the ABC powers would
preside over the conference, with the Brazilian ambassador 
directing mediation.
2) The minutes of the proceedings would be signed by
the representatives and the mediators. The secretaries would 
then countersign. Copies of the minutes— drafted into Portu­
guese, Spanish, and English--would be distributed to all 
parties,
3) In general, separate meetings between mediators
and each delegation would occur informally, without a steno­
graphic report. The full, or plenary sessions, during which 
minutes would be taken, occurred only as occasion required.
4) A plenary conference (consisting of all represen­
tatives and mediators) would be held for the delegates to
express their positions, including stipulation on rejection
or acceptance of an eventual settlement.
5) The conference would be closed by a full session
at which the final results would be stated. Of course, the
14mediators and representatives could make closing addresses.
The mediators’ industriousness impressed many obser­
vers. The actual mechanics saw Da Gama taking charge of the 
diplomatic meetings, while Nafin attended to the oral hear-
14 Few York Times, 20, 21 May 1914; H. Percival Dodge to 
Secretary of State, 20 May 1914, file #812.00/12136, Foreign 
Relations, p. 501; New York Times, 20 May 1914; Review, ’’Vera 
Cruz” , p. 671; Few York Times, 20 May 1914; Emilio Rabassa to 
Roberto Esteva Ruiz, 22 May 1914, Fabela, Documentos, p. 89; 
New York Times, 21, 23 May 1914.
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ings. Suarez Muj ica took charge of the minutes and corres­
pondence. The New York Times correspondent was especially 
impressed with ’’the absence of any spirit of ’mafiana’ ...” 
The efficient manner of the envoys increased confidence in
the ability of the conference to resolve the Mexican situa-
. . 15t ion.
The keynote of the conference was informality. Upon
arriving at the first session of mediation, Lehmann called
out "Play ball!” He, Justice Lamar, Secretary Dodge, and
State Department representative Rose generally arrived from
the American side, usually smoking cigars en route. By the
third day of the conference, the sense of informality had
even lent itself to the adaptation of the tune to ’’When it’s
Apple Blossom Time in Normandy” with different words:
When it’s mediation time in Canada 
In Canada, in Canada 
By the good old falls 
We’ll watch and wait and mediate.
When it's mediation time in Canada 
We’ll come here for a rest,
And we’ 11 pay ten cents to <jgoss the bridge 
Whether going east or west.
To inform the news services, the mediators posted
bulletins announcing the progress of the conference. Each
posting heralded the formation of a small crowd ’’hungrily
15 Few York Times, 24 May 1914.
16 Ibid.
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17reading the meagre details.” The mediators sat in confer­
ence between five and six hours daily, on occasion calling 
for evening sessions when warranted. The rest of the time 
they gave to informal chats, automobile touring, sightseeing, 
and luncheons. As one correspondent recalled, these off 
hours were sometimes taken up listening while
...Justice Lamar tells stories, Mr. Lehmann draws 
on his marvelous store of historical information,
Sefior Da Gama waxes eloquent, Sefiores Naan and 
Su&rez chat continuously with all who address them.
Seflor Rabasa, head of the Mexican delegation, says 
a few words and looks unspeakably wise in so doing.
Senor Elguero, one of his colleagues, looks 
polite, but uncomfortable, and Senor Rodriguez, the 
other, waves his hand toward the Falls with Spanish 
abandon ^gd tells you how perfectly grand it all is 
up here.
On 24 May the New York Times correspondent related that 
each day there were the same daily excitements, the first 
being the arrival of the United States envoys with Secretary 
Dodge, a champion ”at the great game of saying nothing while 
talking a great deal, which has reached its zenith at the 
Niagara Falls Peace Conference.” The second event came at
the end of a meeting, signalled by the appearance of an envoy 
or delegate leaving the solarium. Correspondents would 
inundate the envoy, desperate to learn of the Mexican-Ameri­
can situation, yet ’’chances are that they remain to hear
17 Ibid.
18 New York Times, 20 May 1914.
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[instead] about the comparative merits of the Canadian and
19American Falls."
The last event during the day was a bulletin posting:
At first the bulletins told little except visits to
the envoys and delegates from representatives of
college fraternities and invitations extended to 
the distinguished visitors to view the beauties of
the region. But of late thg^ have been improving;
some even deal with Mexico.
The New York Times correspondent voiced an oft-heard 
complaint about the mediation. Neither the mediators nor the 
delegates freely gave news to reporters. On the trip to 
Niagara, when questioned about his participation, Lehmann 
only told the reporters about the trip he had taken several 
years before on the same train and the wonderful waffles and 
catfish he had shared with Count Johann Heinrich Von Bern- 
storff, the German Ambassador to the U.S. The reporters did
not get much of a story, but the conductor wired ahead and at
the next stop twenty pounds of catfish were placed aboard.
Mr. Lehmann and the American delegation consumed a dinner of
catfish and waffles. The mediators were tight-fisted with 
information about the conference. They wished to handle the 
mediation informally, in the hopes more could be accom­
plished. Part of this informality required privacy. As a
19 Fred Rose to Secretary of State Bryan, 15 June 1914, 
file 812.00/23476, RDS, RG59, NA; Review of Reviews (Ameri­
can), "National-weekly journalism before and after media­
tion", Vol. 50, August 1914, p. 237; Mason, "Information", 
p. 446; New York Times, 22 May 1914.
20 Bulletin, "ABC mediation", p. 185.
result the mediators issued anecdotal trivia to pacify the
21media’s need for information.
Although in most cases editors refrained from specula­
tion, some, like the editor of the New York-based newspaper 
Mexico, used the opportunity to print slanderous and unsubs­
tantiated articles. Although these articles created no
problems for the mediation, one journalist wondered at the
misunderstandings Carranza and Villa might have in the
22absence of hard facts.
The attendance at the conference of both Huerta and
Wilson indicated that each had certain objectives in mind.
The goals of each delegation were so antithetical that the
New York Times published an editorial warning the mediators:
’’the peace envoys must keep constantly on mind that they
cannot take sides...they must assume a non-partisan attitude
23and maintain it to the end." The envoys’ expressed goal
24consisted of "serving the interests of peace." Although 
21 Woodrow Wilson to Commissioners, 24 May 1914, Link, 
Papers, p. 69; Secretary of State to Commissioners, 3 June 
1914, file 812.00/23455a, RDS, RG59, NA.
22 Link, Progressive Era, p. 126-127; Cline, U.S. and 
Mexico, p. 161.
23 Sir Cecil A. Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, 25 May 
1914, Link, Papers, p. 77.
24 Secretary of State to Commissioners, 27 May 1914, 
file 812.00/23445, RDS, RG59, NA; Link, Progressive Era, 
p. 107.
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all parties espoused this view, both Wilson and Huerta had 
different practical ideas.
The United States declared no desire to control either 
the mediation or Mexico, yet President Wilson would not 
accept any solution which did not retire Huerta and place the 
Constitutionalists in power. Wilson judged Huerta an 
assassin, a throwback to the Diaz era. Because the Constitu­
tionalists gained victory in the north, Wilson further 
buttressed his beliefs about Huerta by suggesting that the 
Constitutionalists truly represented the Mexican people. The 
occupation of Veracruz had been an attempt to cut off a major 
supply port for Huerta’s arms and munitions, as well as a 
direct military threat to Mexico City. Wilson seemed truly 
surprised when Mexicans fought bloodily against the Ameri­
cans. Mediation, then, offered Wilson an opportunity to
force Huerta from power, an attitude which the ABC envoys
26clearly recognized and resented.
Even though he did not espouse publicly any particular 
plan to solve the land problems in Mexico, Wilson felt "the 
foremost duty of the United States.,.Cto be] the internal
25 Edmulo SFafin to Argentine Foreign Minister, 21 June 
1914, Link, Papers, p. 198.
26 Link, Progressive Era, p. 113; Cline, U.S. and 
Mexico, p. 160.
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27reform of this unhappy neighbor.” The United States
considered existing land holding patterns responsible for
many social inequities, The American delegates made their
position clear at the first private conference with the
mediators by indicating Wilson’s intention to hold land
reform as one condition for American recognition of any
Mexican government. The United States obviously insisted
that there could be no peace in Mexico as long as the
28underlying economic problems continued.
The United States view confounded the mediators. As
Na5n reported to the Argentine Foreign Minister:
I. . . [emphasized] the impropriety involved in the 
direct and partisan intervention of the American 
delegation.... I reminded President Wilson...that 
he Chad] expressed the position of his government 
in these words: 'A Mexican solution of the Mexican
problem’ in order that he might realize 
contradiction implicit in the present attitude,
Others, like concerned observer Andrew Carnegie, wrote to
Wilson: ’’the presuming Civilized Nation determined to
interfere and Coerce his less advanced labor [sic] deserves
27 Andrew Carnegie to Woodrow Wilson, 21 May 1914, Link,
Papers, p. 61; Sir Cecil A. Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey,
25 May 1914, Link, Papers, p. 77.
28 Sir Cecil A. Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, 25 May 
1914, Link, Papers, p. 77; Secretary of State to Commission­
ers, 27 May 1914, file 812.00/23445, RDS, RG59, NA; Link, 
Progressi ve Era, p . 107.
29 Cline, U.S. and Mexico, p. 161; Larry Hill, Emis­
saries to a Revolution (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1973), p. 177.
30repulse and usually gets it.” Vilson had all but stated
31that he expected to control the outcome of the conference.
Huerta’s removal signaled the principal objective of 
Wilsonian policy. Before mediation began, the State Depart­
ment made it clear that a simple apology to the United States 
would not solve the issues leading to the Veracruz invasion.
As the conference progressed and the Constitutionalists 
gained victory in the field, Huerta’s resignation became a 
daily expectation, the only question being how and when. On
21 May, Da Gama received hopeful news from Cardoso de
32Oliveira, the Brazilian legation officer in Mexico City.
Huerta indicated he might instruct his delegates to 
tender his resignation if it would further the cause of peace 
in Mexico. Throughout the rest of the month many sources 
reported his resignation, notices which constantly weakened 
his position, and ” increaseedl danger of mob rule and anar­
chy.” At last on 2 June 1914, the Mexican delegates issued a
^  Jew York Times, 21, 22, 27 May 1914; Commissioners to 
Secretary of State, 23 May 1914, File 812.00/23439, RDS, 
RG59, NA.
31 Jew York Times, 3 June 1914; Secretary of State to 
Commissioners, 24 May 1914, Link, Papers, p. 70; Sir Cecil 
A. Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, 25 May 1914, Ibid, p. 79; 
Marvin Ferrer to Woodrow Wilson, 10 June 1914, File 
812.00/23464, RDS, RG59, NA; Commissioners to Secretary of 
State, 23 May 1914, File 812.00/23440, Ibid.
32 Outlook, "ABC Plan as seen in Mexico” , Vol 107, 30 
May 1914, p. 236.
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statement that they were authorized to submit Huerta’s
33presidential resignation.
Huerta, of course, wanted mediation to validate his
claim to power. His belief that mediation would lead only to
U. S. evacuation from Veracruz prompted his acceptance of the
conference. The Huerta government wanted to skirt internal
reform and the president’s resignation. On acceptance of
mediation, the huertistas believed that mediation might even
34lead to a United States recognition of the regime.
As May ended Huerta lost hope. The Administration
warned Lamar and Lehmann that the Mexican delegates would
make a last ditch-effort to save their elitist privileges.
The United States delegation worked to foil Huertista
aspirations. Even so, if mediation could not obtain his
resignation, then, as the German newspaper Kolnische Zeitung
suggested, perhaps Wilson would drag matters out until
35Carranza and Villa took Mexico City.
33 Ibid,
34 Review of Reviews (Americans), ’’Mediation at Niagara 
and After” , Vol. 50, July 1914, p. 35; Charles Cumberland, 
Mexican Revolution; The Constitutionalist Years (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1974), p, 295; Robert Quirk, The 
Mexican Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana State University
Press, 1960), p. 49; New York Times, 23 May 1914; The
Literary Digest, ’’Moving toward Peace in Mexico” , Vol 49, 4 
July 1914, p. 6 ,
35 Kolnische Zeitung as referred to in The Literary 
Digest, ’’Doubts about Mexican Mediation” , Vol. 48, 30 May
1914, p. 1305; Ibid.
Military pressure weighed heavily on Huerta's govern­
ment. The Constitutionalists went from one victory to 
another after the United States occupied Veracruz. Between 
24 April and 8 July, rebel forces took Monterrey, Nuevo 
Laredo, Tampico, Zacatecas, Saltillo, and Guadalajara. The 
early summer victory of Pancho Villa over Huerta’s federates 
at Zacatecas spelled the end to effective Huerta resistance 
to the Constitutionalist onslaught. In an interview with the
New York Times, Jos£ Vasconcelos predicted that Carranza
36would be in Mexico City by the end of July.
The Constitutionalist progress weakened Huerta not only
in Mexico but in mediation. By the end of May Huerta sent
telegrams to the Mexican delegation "urging that a protocol
be completed and signed as soon as passible, because of the
danger from the advancing Constitutionalists.” John Lind,
one of President Wilson’s special envoys, recommended
"negative action"— that is a "wait and see” attitude— until
Carranza took Mexico City and eliminated the Huerta issue 
37altogether.
On the opening day, the conference turned its attention 
to various plans to establish a caretaker government to rule 
Mexico in Huerta’s stead until formal elections could take
3 0 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 21 May 1914, 
File 812.00/23436, RDS, RG59, NA; John Lind to Secretary of 
State, 10 June 1914, File 812.00/23465, Ibid.
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place. Secretary of State Bryan suggested a commission of 
three or four persons to rule Mexico on an interim basis. 
Bryan thought Madera’s Foreign Minister Pedro Lascurain would 
serve along with one person selected by the Constitution­
alists, and a third chosen by these two "... to get away from
the apparent succession to Huerta and to set up an authority
3 Sfree from former cabinet influences.”'
The United States felt any interim Mexican authority
must be acceptable to the Constitutionalists. Some Wilsonian
advisors ruled out Villa and Carranza as being too pivotal
for such a minor role. Ideally they favored a moderate
39Const itut ionalist.
Another proposed plan suggested that the conference 
select a provisional president and cabinet to rule Mexico. 
This plan adhered more closely to the current Mexican 
constitution than Bryan’s commission idea. However, the 
mediators modified the plan after realizing the great number 
of candidates.^
3 3 Woodrow Wilson to Commissioners, 21 May 1914, Link, 
Papers, p. 57; Arthur S. Link to Secretary of State, 10 June 
1914, File 812.00/23465, RDS, RG59, NA.
39 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 2 June 1914, 
File 812. 00/23455, RDS, RG59, NA; The Independent, ’’Mexican 
Conference” , Vol. 78, 22 June 1914, p. 511.
40 Secretary of State to Commissioners, 26 May 1914, 
Link, Papers, p. 83; J . R. Lamar to Secretary of State, 20 May 
1914, File 812.00/23435, RDS, RG59, NA; Secretary of State to 
Commissioners, 21 May 1914, File 812.00/23435, Ibid.
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The final plan called for the conference to select a 
provisional president, who would then be appointed by Huerta 
to the post of Foreign Minister. By constitutional succes­
sion, Huerta's resignation would make the Foreign Minister 
the new president. Once the candidate became provisional 
president, he would select his own cabinet, submitting his 
choices to the conference for approval. The provisional 
government could then set out to pacify Mexico and begin land
reform programs. After establishing a measure of peace the
41provisional government could hold a fair election.
The provisional government, thus selected, would be
recognized immediately by the United States, Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile. It would establish commissions for
international claims and provide amnesty for all offenses
committed during the Civil War. The mediators also suggested
that the United States evacuate Veracruz fifteen days after
the establishment of the provisional government, to be
completed within a month— unless the provisional government
42granted an extension.
One of the difficulties the mediators faced concerned 
enforcement of any plan. If Huerta or the Constitutionalists
41 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 26 May 1914,
Link, Papers, p. 87; Hamilton Holt, "Mediation Deadlock and
the way out", The Independent, Vol 78, 29 June 1914, p. 543.
42 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 26 May 1914,
Link, Papers, p. 87.
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did not agree, enforcement would be left to the United States 
and the ABC powers. Since none of the three Latin American 
powers had close commercial ties with Mexico or large 
concentrations of nationals living there, the mediators 
doubted their ability to police the situation. The Brazilian 
legation officer, Cardoso de Oliveira, had so much difficulty- 
protecting United States interests in the capital after 
severance of diplomatic relations that Secretary of State 
Bryan, contrary to his goal, entrusted the protection of 
United States citizens and property to the French and English 
in cities other than the capital. Obviously, the ABC powers 
could not force compliance to any mediation plan. The
United States under Wilson did not care to enforce any 
solution by arms after Veracruz. Although the War Department 
had elaborate plans to occupy Mexico, the idea of bloodshed 
repelled the President, who felt recognition to be the United 
States’ only weapon. The slim possibility existed that the 
mediators might hit upon a solution by which the United 
States could not abide, in which case, "the war would have to
proceed with the sympathy of the whole of Latin America
overtly on Mexico’s side.”^
43 Secretary of State to Commissioners, 24 May 1914, 
File 812.00/23452d, RDS, RG59, NA; Secretary of State to 
Commissioners, 3 June 1914, File 812.00/23455a, Ibid; New 
York Times, 20 May 1914; Secretary of State to Commissioners, 
27 May 1914, File 812.00/23445, RDS, RG59, NA; Outlook, ”ABC
Plan as seen in Mexico” , Vol. 107, 30 May 1914, p. 236;
Woodrow Wilson to Commissioners, 24 May 1914, Link, Papers, 
p. 69.
The Conference recognized that the use of force in any 
mediation plan would be counterproductive to a lasting 
peace. With the goal of peace firmly planted in mind, the 
mediators struggled toward a solution.
CHAPTER THREE
”THREE PIG-HEADED MEM”
As the Mediators increasingly realized the limitations 
of their actions, they worked to make the conference success­
ful. They tried to get all of the major parties— Americans, 
huertistas, and Constitutionalists— to participate in the 
conference. The mediators, however, wanted to consider 
internal reform, a topic whose validity Carranza denied.
They required an armistice, an issue violated frequently.
The mediators’ stubbornness in these conditions, along with 
the temperaments of Vi Ison, Carranza, and Huerta disrupted 
conference progress, and threatened to obliterate the 
mediation attempt altogether. One of the key problems the
mediators faced concerned the Constitutionalists and their
’’First Chief” Venustiano Carranza. As the leader of the 
major anti- Huerta faction, Voodrow Wilson naturally favored 
him in the Mexican supremacy battle. Moreover, Wilson
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believed Carranza ” ...to be an honest person,,.who can be
1counted upon no doubt to try to do the right thing.,.”
Carranza received an invitation to send delegates to
Niagara Falls because the ABC envoys desired to mediate both
internal and external Mexican conflicts. On 29 April 1914,
Carranza sent his acceptance ”in principle.” A week later,
Carranza dispatched Rafael Zubardn Capmany to represent him
in a "spirit of cordiality.” Carranza also inquired as to
the subject matter of the conference. Instead of answering,
the mediators imperiously notified him that if hostilities
toward Huerta were not halted, his invitation would be 
2recalled. The mediators felt that in as much as Carranza
had accepted their mediation, out of necessity he would
accept an armistice. Also, they believed themselves to
have U.S. support.
Carranza responded, saying he found ’’cessation of
3hostilities to be inconsistent with his goal.” Observers of
Voodrow Wilson to Walter Hines Page, 4 June 1914, 
Link, Papers.
2 Venustiano Carranza to Mediators, 2 May 1914, Fabela, 
Documentos, p. 143; Venustiano Carranza to Rafael Zubar&n, 2 
May 1914, Ibid, p. 26; Venustiano Carranza to Secretary of
State, 4 May 1914, File 812.00/23426, RDS, RG59, NA; Rafael 
Zubar&n to Mediators, 4 May 1914, Fabela, Documentos, p. 41; 
Rafael Zubar&n to Mediators, 28 May 1914, File 812.00/12130, 
USDS, Foreign Relations, p. 519; Venustiano Carranza to 
Mediators, 29 A^pril 1914, File 812.00/12130, Ibid, p. 517.
3 Jose Lopez Portillo to Mediators, 30 April 1914, 
Fabela, Documentos, p. 22\ Mediators to Roberto Esteva Ruiz, 
5 May 1914, Ibid, p. 47; Roberto Esteva Ruiz to Mediators, 6 
May 1914, Ibid, p. 50; "The Taking of Veracruz and what 
followed” , Review of Reviews (American), Vol 79, June 1914,
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the Mexican situation felt that even if the First Chief had 
declared an armistice, his followers, like Villa, would have 
continued fighting. Carranza reasoned that an armistice 
would lead to the disbandment his armies, leaving Constitu­
tionalist areas unprotected in case mediation failed. 
Carranza tried to avoid further alienation of Villa. The two 
chieftains had already disagreed on the nature of the United 
States’ occupation of Veracruz. While Carranza believed it 
an attack of Mexican sovereignty, Villa felt it to be no such
threat, Further antagonism might rend the revolutionary
4unity, depriving Carranza of one of his best field generals.
Once reports concerning the extent of mediation filtered 
in to Carranza’s command center in Torrefin, Durango, the 
First Chief sent protesting telegrams to the mediators, the 
State Department, and his representatives. He differentiated 
between the United States-Mexican conflict and the huertista- 
-Constitutionalist Civil War. Consequently Carranza would 
accept mediation only on the Tampico flag incident, the
p. 670.
4 Sir Cecil A. Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey, 25 May 
1914, Link, Papers, p. 78\ Sir Cecil A. Spring Rice to Sir 
Edward Grey, 1 June 1914, Ibid, p. 133-, ’’Mexican Conference” , 
The Independent, Vol. 78, 22 June 1914, p. 511; Commissioners
to Secretary of State, 23 May 1914, File 812.00/23439, PDS, 
RG59, HA.
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arrest of the United States mail orderly at Veracruz, and the
5United States invasion and occupation of Veracruz.
Carranza rejected discussion of subjects that infringed 
on Mexican sovereignty, including the establishment of a 
provisional government, land reform issues, and the validity 
of the actions of the Huerta government and concomitant loans 
or debts. The mediators saw in Carranza’s response a 
definite rejection of the Niagara Falls Conference. Further, 
Carranza’s decision to repudiate all the actions of Huerta’s 
government made United States delegates Lehmann and Lamar 
fear that this position would jeopardize any plan to turn the 
provisional government over to the Constitutionalists.^
Carranza’s contrariness toward the conference irritated 
the mediators. The envoys had undertaken the mediation of 
all existing conditions. The Constitutionalist response, 
they claimed, was ” ... advance notice that the constitution­
alists will not feel bound by any decision that may be
5 Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 294; Commissioners 
to Secretary of State, 31 May 1914, File 812.00/12130, USDS, 
Foreign Relations, p, 514\ Venustiano Carranza to Rafael 
Zubardn, 20 June 1914, Fabela, Documentos, p. 138; Venustiano 
Carranza to Mediators, 1 May 1914, Ibid, p, 23; Commissioners 
to Secretary of State, 16 June 1914, File 812.00/23477, RDS, 
RG59, NA; New York Times, 23 May 1914; Commissioners to
Secretary of State, 22 May 1914, File 812.00/23437, RDS, 
RG59, NA.
^ ’’Mexican Conference” , p. 511; Hamilton Holt, "Media­
tion Deadlock and the way out” , The Independent, Vol. 78, 29
June 1914, p. 543; ’’Moving toward peace in Mexico” , The 
Literary Digest, Vol. 49, 4 July 1914, p. 7.
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7made.” The mediators did not, however, reject constitution­
a l  ist participation. In fact, they welcomed it, provided 
that they accepted the scope of mediation. The Constitution­
alists could not come to the conference except under the same
armistice conditions agreed to by Huerta and the United 
3States.
To remedy the absence of the Constitutionalists, the 
United States tried to represent them. Yet the United States 
felt uncomfortable speaking for Carranza. The delays 
involved in ascertaining Constitutionalist views prompted 
Secretary of State Bryan to urge delegates Lamar and Lehmann 
to push the mediators to accept the Constitutionalist 
representatives, "...even though they [the Constitution-
9alists] insist upon conditions which may seem unreasonable.” 
Many sides pressured the mediators to accept a Constitu­
tionalist representative. The Paris Temps reported: ’’The
mediating powers, if they wish to assure a definite peace,
7 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 31 May 1914,
Link, Papers, 123; H. Percival Dodge to Secretary of State,
13 June 1914, File 812.00/12240, USDS, Foreign Relations, 
p. 529; Commissioners to Secretary of State, 23 May 1914,
File 812.00/23439, RDS, RG59, NA.
Q H. Percival Dodge to Secretary of State, 13 June 1914, 
File 812.00/12240, USDS, Foreign Relations, p. 529; New York 
Times, 24 May 1914; Mediators to Secretary of State, 25 May 
1914, File 812.00/23444, RDS, RG59, NA.
9 Secretary of State to Commissioners, 25 May 1914,
Link, Fapers, p. 75; "Mexican Conference” , p. 511, Secretary 
of State to Commissioners, 31 May 1914, File 812.00/23451, 
RDS, RG59, NA; Commissioners to Secretary of State, 1 June 
1914, File 812.00/23453, /bid,
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must be able to induce the Mexican factions to agree on a 
10compromise." United States news magazines reported that
the mediators wanted to admit a carrancista representative
” ...at the eleventh hour, for they know he will have to be
11reckoned with sooner or later....” Carranza himself wrote 
to General Alvaro Obregbn that the conference could not have 
a satisfactory result without Constitutionalist represen­
tation since the carrancistas represented the majority of
TUT • 1 2Mexicans.
On 29 May 1914, Carranza notified the mediators by
telegram that he would send representatives to the confei—
ence. Two weeks later, the First Chief officially designated
Fernando Iglesias Calderon, Luis Cabrera, and Jos§ Vascon-
celos. Before the mediators received Carranza’s telegram,
Zubardn, through whom it was sent, released it to the Few
York Times, who published it. The mediators, upon reading
their letter in the paper, responded that they "considered it
most improper. . .and if. . .the newspaper was correct, the
13letter was...a protest against the scope of the mediation.”
10 "Doubts about Mexican mediation” , The Literary 
Digest, Vol. 48, 30 May 1914, p. 1305.
11 "Support the Mediators", The Independent, Vol. 78, 29
June 1914, p. 472.
12 Venustiano Carranza to Alvaro ObregSn, 29 June 1914, 
Fabela, Documentos, p. 148; Venustiano Carranza to Secretary 
of State, 4 May 1914, File 812.00/23426, RDS, RG59, NA.
13 Few York Times, 24 May 1914; Commissioners to 
Secretary of State, 30 May 1914, File 812.00/23450, RDS, 
RG59, NA.
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American delegates Lamar and Lehmann urged that the
newspaper might have picked up the letter while on the
telegraph wire, finally convincing the mediators to receive
the Constitutionalist communication. Even so, the mediators
seemed very reluctant to receive the Constitutionalists.
They insisted that Carranza’s willingness to enter into
discussion resulted from munition shortages. His request to
join the conference simply constituted a delaying tactic.
After considering the ’’Zubar&n letter,” the mediators decided
to request a clarification of such areas as armistice and 
/
extensions of mediation. Pending this clarification,
14Carranza could send his delegates.
The Constitutionalist delegates delayed, however,
because of internal dissension between Carranza and Villa,
Pancho Villa had begun to disagree with the Constitutionalist
First Chief. With Villa’s popularity, the split in the rebel
15ranks threatened ominously.
Although Carranza sent representatives to Niagara, the 
armistice issue proved insurmountable. As a result, the 
mediators did not accept the Constitutionalists. Early on,
Carranza in an open letter announced that ’’suspension [of
14 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 30 May 1914, 
File 812.00/23450, RDS, RG59, FA; Commissioners to Secretary
of State, 31 May 1914, File 812.00/23452, Ibid-, New York
Times, 30 May 1914; Commissioners to Secretary of State,
2 June 1914, File 812.00/23455, RDS, RG59, NA.
15 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 24 June 1914, 
File 812.00/23487, RDS, RG59, NA.
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hostilities] would accrue only to the benefit of Huer- 
16ta, ...” By sending representatives to the Niagara confei—
ence, Carranza gave the mediators responsibility for refusing
Constitutionalist representation and consequently continuing
17hostilities in Mexico,
Carranza felt that the war should be pressed, ignoring 
Wilson’s envoys and representatives. The Constitutionalists 
doubted that the United States would use force to ensure an 
armistice. Furthermore, Carranaza’s lack of representation 
at the conference maintained a position independent from
1 boutside influences.
Throughout the conference the struggle over armistice
played an important role. The United States delegates
frequently complained that mediation was "practically
19impossible while active hostilities continued.” The
mediators and American delegates even suggested an embargo
against Mexico to prevent arms from reaching either Huerta or
20Carranza, a policy which Wilson had unsuccessfully tried.
Few York Times, 5 May 1914.
17 Few York Times, 12 June 1914.
IB Few York Times, 23 May 1914; Secretary of State to 
Commissioners, 29 May 1914, File 812.00/23452g, EDS, RG59, NA,
19 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 1 June 1914, 
File 812.00/23453, EDS, RG59, NA.
20 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 25 May 1914, 
Link, Papers, p. 75.
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Carranza’s refusal of an armistice, combined, with his 
insistence on sending delegates to the conference, strongly- 
rebuffed the ABC envoys. Thus, these diplomats did not wish 
to renew the invitation, certainly not without some assurance 
of acceptance. The mediators also believed the Constitution­
alists would ultimately agree with the United States and 
huertista delegates to accept any plan of settlement, 
regardless of the armistice. The New York Times supported 
this view. It further suggested that when Huerta fled, he 
would sack the national treasury. Since United States 
recognition could provide the stability needed for interna­
tional loans, the author of the Times article claimed that
21the United States would prevail.
The American delegation introduced several issues to
persuade the mediators to change their minds. They cited the
1907 Hague Conference ruling that armistice need not be a
prerequisite to mediation "...unless suspension is provided
22for by special agreement." Although the mediators recog­
nized the rule, they claimed that it did not apply when, as
the mediators had done, the terms of mediation were stated in 
23advance.
^  New York Times, 24 May, 13 June 1914.
22 Secretary of State to Woodrow Wilson, 19 May 1914, 
Link, Fapers, p. 47; Secretary of State to Mediators, 30 May 
1914, File 812.00/23452h, RDS, RG59, MA.
23 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 31 May 1914, 
Link, Fapers, p. 224.
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Regardless, the mediators refused to budge from their
stated position. When it appeared that the conference might
have reached a total impasse, the American delegate asked if
Carranza might assent to participating in the conference with
the understanding that within a certain number of days he
would call a cessation of hostilities. Wilson vetoed the
idea and suggested that it might be useful ”to have the
Mexican delegates feel that things will settle themselves if
24they do not promptly come to terms.”
Besides the Constitutionalists' general refusal, the
armistice issue arose three other times during the confer—
ence. The first incident occurred shortly after acceptance
of mediation. Throughout early May 1914, Roberto Esteva
Ruiz, Huerta’s Foreign Minister, complained of United States
military activity at Veracruz to Chilean legation officers.
When the mediators and the Chilean representatives inquired
at the State Department, they received a twofold reply; the
United States occupied Veracruz prior to mediation. As a
consequence naval transports there did not constitute hostile
actions. Secondly, since the United States was not tech-
25nically at war with Mexico there could be no armistice,
24 Woodrow Wilson to Secretary of State, 20 May 1914, 
Link, Fapers, p. 49.
25 Sir Cecil A. Spring Rice to Woodrow Wilson, 21 May 
1914, Link, Fapers, 59; Sir Cecil A. Spring Rice to Sir Edward
Grey, 25 May 1914, Ibid, p. ?8\ Secretary of State to
Spanish Ambassador Ju&n Riafio, 28 April 1914, File 
312.00/23493A, RDS, RG59, NA; Mediators to Secretary of
State, 6 May 1914, File 812.00/23427, USDS, Foreign Rela~
The second armistice issue concerned a lighthouse on the 
Isla de Lobos off of Veracruz. After the United States put 
its military government in place, some of the local inhabi­
tants feared that cooperation with the occupation force would 
cause retaliatory actions after evacuation. The Mexican 
staff of the Isla de Lobos lighthouse consequently abandoned 
their post. Fearing a shipwreck without the lighthouse, the 
United States Army simply dispatched a contingent to occupy
the facility. On 9 May 1914, the Huerta government protested 
the action. The United States fully explained the circum­
stances surrounding the occupation: the only reason they
took the lighthouse was to prevent an interruption of
commerce. Delegates Lamar and Lehmann informed the confer—
ence that the United States would be happy to turn the
26lighthouse over to any responsible Mexican authority.
Lastly, as the military campaigns of the Constitution­
alist generals spread southward, the seaport of Tampico
tions, p. 497; Chilean Legation to Secretary of State, 6 May 
1914, File 812.00/23427, USDS, Foreign Relations, p. 498; 
Secretary of State to Mediators, 8 May 1914, File
812.00/23427, Ibid, p. 498; Roberto Esteva Ruiz to Mediators, 
5 May 1914, Fabela, Documentos, p. 46; Secretary of State to 
Mediators, 9 May 1914, File 812.00/23428, RDS, RG59, FA; 
Secretary of State to Mediators, 8 May 1914, File
812.00/23427, Ibid.
30 Mediators to Jos§ Lopez Portillo, 29 April 1914, 
Fabela, Documentos, p. 22\ Roberto Esteva Ruiz to Mediators, 
9 May 1914, Ibid, p. 85; Mediators to Secretary of State, 9 
May 1914, File 812.00/23429, RDS, RG59, NA; Secretary of 
State to Mediators, 12 May 1914, File 812.00/23430, Ibid;
Mediators to Secretary of State, 14 May 1914, File 
812.00/23431, Ibid.
fell. Both. Huerta and Carranza required arms. Since
Huerta could not use Veracruz, Tampico’s fall to the Consti­
tutionalists put more stress on Huerta as his supplies 
dwindled. On '6 June 1914, Spanish Ambassador Riafio (repre­
senting Huerta in, the United States during the diplomatic 
break) reported to the State Department that Huerta intended 
to blockade Tampico. The United States informed the med­
iators that it could not ’’recognize the legality of the
27proposed blockade.” Bryan also asked the Spanish Ambas­
sador to use his influence to dissuade Huerta of such 
action in order to prevent losses to large oil concerns in 
Mexico. Yet Bryan noted that such a blockade in Tampico
would be . .helpful to Huerta and hurtful to the constitu-
28tionalists only.” The combined pressure worked; Huerta
29abandoned the blockade attempt.
The other major issue on which the conference bogged 
down concerned the formation of a provisional government. 
The plan recommended by the mediators called for Huerta to
27 Secretary of State to Commissioners, 7 June 1914, 
File 812.00/234592, RDS, RG59, NA.
28 Woodrow Wilson to Secretary of State, 18 May 1914, 
File 812.00/23433, RDS, RG59, NA; Secretary of State to
Commissioners, 6 June 1914, File 812.00/234582, Ibid.
29 Woodrow Wilson to Commissioners, 24 May 1914, Link, 
Papers, p. 69; Secretary of State to Commissioners, 26 May 
1914, File 812.00/23444, RDS, RG59, NA; Secretary of State to 
Commissioners, 6 June 1914, File 812.00/234582, Ibid; Fred 
Rose to Secretary of State, 7 June 1914, File 812.00/23462, 
Ibid; Commissioners to Secretary of State, 7 June 1914, File 
812.00/23461, Ibid.
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name a new foreign minister. Huerta would resign, making
the foreign minister president by constitutional succession.
The mediators then foresaw a junta joining the new presi-
30dent. Jointly they would hold a presidential election.
To this plan Huerta’s delegation recommended some 
modifications:
The foreign minister would be neutral; the panel to 
aid the provisional president would be split— two 
representatives from each of the factions.
The provisional government would declare a general 
and absolute political amnesty and call for immediate 
elections.
The new government would pay special attention to 
agricultural issues, electoral legislation, and primary 
and agricultural education.
The provisional government would be recognized im­
mediately by the United States, and United States
military forces would be evacuated within fifteen
, 31days.
The United States objected. They could not and would 
not recognize a neutral government. Carrancista victories 
convinced the President and Secretary of State of ovei—  
whelming Constitutionalist support, Since the United States
Few York Times, 23 May, 2 June 1914.
31 H. Percival Dodge to Secretary of State, 9 June 1914, 
File 812.00/122211-, USDS, Foreign Relations, p. 525.
refused further military intervention, any plan had to be
implemented by a Constitutionalist. Also, the United States
wanted a Constitutiona1ist majority on the board of the
provisional government. Apropos of the Veracruz evacuation,
the American delegates suggested that the military remain
indefinitely, at least until arrangements for the evacuation
32had been made with the elected government.
On 12 June 1914, Huerta’s delegation responded sharply 
to the American comments. In an interview with Justice 
Lamar, Huerta representative Emilio Rabasa, without consul­
ting Huerta, absolutely refused to turn over the government 
to the Constitutionalists. As to the Constitutionalists’ 
representing a Mexican majority, Rabasa pointed out that 
carrancista areas only contained about five million inhabi­
tants, while more than ten million people lived in the
remainder. ’’The numerical majority is not. . . in favor of the 
33revolution.” Further, Rabasa claimed that if Carranza did 
have majority support, he could be elected under a neutral 
government. At the same time,'he claimed, ”A government of 
revolutionaries . . , would turn an election any way it
32 Secretary of State to Commissioners, 30 June 1914, 
File 812.00/23490, RDS, RG59, NA.
33 H. Percival Dodge to Secretary of State, 16 June
1914, File 812.00/12288, USDS, Foreign Relations, p. 536;
’’The Mexican Conference” , p. 547; H. Percival Dodge to
Secretary of State, 20 June 1914, File 812.00/12314, USDS, 
Foreign Relations, p, 542.
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wished. The public vote ...[would be] falsified and the
34result would be the election of another revolutionary.”
The United States vehemently denied that President
Wilson intended to sway the Mexican election. The Secretary
of State explicitly stated that success for the provisional
government depended on its independence from international
influences. The United States government simply did not feel
it could recognize a neutral provisional government because
” ...there can be no such persons in Mexico among men of force
35and character. All men of real stuff have taken sides.”
The whole attitude of Huerta's representatives and the
mediators surprised the Americans, who had "assumed that they
would assent to the establishment of a government composed
36exclusively of Constitutionalists.” The United States did
not believe that a neutral government could exist. Also, 
Carranza would not accept a non-Constituttonalist govern­
ment. Considering his military position, he could well
34 "The Mexican Conference", p. 547; J.R. Lamar to 
Secretary of State, 12 June 1914, File 812.00/12263*, USDS, 
Foreign Relations, p. 527; "Moving Toward Peace in Mexico", 
The Literary Digest, Vol. 49, 4 July 1914, p. 7.
35 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 26 May 1914,
File 812. 00/23445, RDS, RG59, NA; Commissioners to Secretary
of State, 12 June 1914, File 812.00/23470, Ibid; Commission­
ers to Secretary of State, 28 May 1914, File 812.00/23446, 
Ibid-, Holt, "Mediation Deadlock", p. 543; Commissioners to 
Secretary of State, 20 May 1914, File 812.00/23435, RDS, 
RG59, NA; "The Mexican Conference” , p. 547; Secretary of
State to Commissioners, 3 June 1914, File 812. 00/23455A, RDS, 
RG59, NA; "Moving Toward Peace in Mexico", p. 7.
3 0 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 25 May 1914,
File 812.00/23444, RDS, RG59, NA.
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afford to ignore any plan he wished, A rejection ran the
37slight risk of U.S. intervention.
Not only did Carranza reject a neutral provisional 
government, but he also wanted control of a military govern­
ment to oust Huerta and all huertista elements. Undaunted, 
Bryan sent futile messages to the special agents and consuls 
in northern Mexico, encouraging them to procure approval of
the provisional government and the possibility of a neutral
38as provisional president.
During the diplomatic conflict, several newspapers
suggested alternatives. While agreeing that there were no
neutrals left in Mexico, one article suggested that the
solution was to find a Constitutionalist whose ".,.character,
standing, and conduct would make him acceptable to the other 
39party. ’’ Another suggested a bipartisan election committee 
in which the Constitutionalists watched elections in Huerta—
controlled areas while Huertistas watched the north to insure
• 4- 40just results.
37 "The Mexican Conference” , The Independent, Vol. 78, 
29 June 1914, p. 548; ’’The Mexican Conference", p. 511;
Secretary of State to Commissioners, 27 May 1914, File
812.00/23445, RDS, RG59, NA.
O Q
"Negotiation Prolonged” , The Independent, Vol. 78, 29
June 1914, p. 548; "The Mexican Conference", p. 511; Secre­
tary of State to Commissioners, 27 May 1914, File
812.00/23445, RDS, RG59, NA.
39 Few York Times, 1 June 1914.
40 "The Mexican Conference” , p. 547; Secretary of State 
to Woodrow Wilson, 30 May 1914, Link, Papers, p. 113; "Moving 
Toward Peace in Mexico” , The Literary Digest, Vol. 49, 4 July
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In an attempt to reach a conclusion, the mediators 
decided to select a provisional president. Among the
candidates considered were: Pedro Lascurain, who should have
succeeded Madera; Francisco Carbajal, Madero’s Chief Justice; 
Adolfo de la Lama, Huerta’s Treasury Minister; General Lauro 
Villar, who, although he had served Madero, remained neutral 
in the military conflict; Doctor Eduardo Liceaga, who was a 
"man of no weight;” General Emiliano Lojero, a huertista 
general; and General Jose Mier, Governor of Jalisco under 
Huerta.^
President Wilson’s choices for the provisional presiden­
cy included General Felipe Angeles and Luis Cabrera. Angeles 
had been Undersecretary of War under Carranza in the Consti­
tutionalist cabinet, while Cabrera had served the Constitu-
42tionalist cause in diplomatic and bureaucratic functions.
The news service also commented on possible candidates.
A reprinted editorial, reputedly from the Constitutionalist
1914, p. 7; Commissioners to Secretary of State, 18 June 
1914, File 812.00/23478, RDS, RG59, NA.
41 Secretary of State to Commissioners, 12 June 1914, 
File 812.00/23468, RDS, RG59, NA; Secretary of State to
Commissioners, 21 May 1914, File 812.00/23435, RDS, RG59, NA; 
Secretary of State to Commissioners, 12 June 1914, File 
812.00/23472, RDS, RG59, NA; Commissioners to Secretary of 
State, 13 June 1914, File 812,00/23472, RDS, RG59, NA;
Commissioners to Secretary of State, 21 May 1914, Link, 
Papers, p. 57; Secretary of State to Commissioners, 15 June 
1914, File 812.00/23476B, RDS, RG59, NA.
42 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 20 May 1914, 
Link, Papers, p. 56; Secretary of State to Commissioners, 12 
June 1914, File 812.00/23468, RDS, RG59, NA.
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daily El Bravo, of Ciudad Juarez, tried to discredit Car­
ranza, comparing him unfavorably to Villa, The article 
accused Carranza of misappropriation of the Constitutionalist 
treasury, while applauding Villa’s heroic efforts. Other 
articles viewed the whole selection process less kindly, 
suggesting that ’’the American delegates [were] more interes­
ted in inquiring into the personal morals of constitution­
alist leaders, determining how many of them were polygamists
and inebriates, than in learning what evidences of capability
43to govern Mexico the Constitutionalists have shown.”
Not all observers of the conference criticized the
proceedings. The Few York Times considered it quite an
accomplishment that the mediation had progressed to the point
where candidates for the provisional presidency could be
considered. News releases became scantier. The mediators
had requested that all names considered be kept confidential
since mere consideration could be ruinous to the man and his
reputation. Anyone considered would face great pressures
from both sides, Constitutionalists and huertistas. He might
also face personal threats. Although frustrated, the news
44service complied.
^  JTeiv York Times, 22 May 1914; Gregory Mason, "Media­
tion without information” , Outlook, Vol. 107, 27 June 1914, 
p. 446.
44 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 28 May 1914, 
Link, Papers, p. 98; Few York Times, 23 May 1914.
The mediation plan for a provisional president created
another problem for the United States. If a Huerta-appointed
foreign minister became Mexican President, Bryan feared
recognition of the provisional government would imply
recognition of Huerta. The Secretary of State anticipated
such embarrassment that he suggested having both Huerta and
his foreign minister resign, allowing Madera’s foreign
minister, Pedro Lascurain, to return to office as if the
45Huerta regime had been a bad dream.
United States concern over recognition began on the 
first day of the conference when, in his opening address, Da 
Gama referred to Huerta’s delegates as ’’representatives of 
the United Mexican States.” Brazil had recognized Huerta as 
the de facto Mexican president, while the United States had 
not. American delegates even refused to sign the minutes 
until their objections to the designation were clearly 
acknowledged in the protocols. In fact, Bryan's plan for a
provisional commission stemmed from the recognition issue.
Mediation slowed to a crawl over the issues of Constitu­
tionalist representation, armistice, and the provisional 
government. General impressions indicated that the end of 
the conference had arrived. According to one Mexican
45 ’’The Mexican Conference” , p. 511; Secretary of State 
to Commissioners, 29 May 1914, Link, Papers, p, 99.
46 Secretary of State to Commissioners, 29 May 1914, 
File 812.00/23446, RDS, KG59, NA; Commissioners to Secretary 
of State, 30 May 1914, Link, Papers, p. 115.
representative, the only danger to the conference would have
been if Wilson, Huerta, or Carranza, ’’the three pig-headed
4 7men in the situation,” had repudiated mediation. Wilson
negated the provisional government and the armistice, Huerta 
refused a Constitutionalist majority in the provisional 
government. Carranza denied the very idea of a provisional 
government and the armistice. With none of the parties 
willing to compromise, mediation was deadlocked.
47 Hamilton Holt, "Niagara Falls Mediation Conference", 
The Independent, Vol. 78, 22 June 1914, p. 520; "Support the 
Mediators” , The Independent, Vol. 78, 15 June 1914, p, 472.
CHAPTER 4
WHEN DIPLOMACY AND REALITY DO NOT MEET
Although deadlocked, over Carranza’s refusal to cease 
warring on Huerta and the mediators’ refusal to admit 
Carranza without an armistice, the diplomats continued to 
grapple with the complex issues. They showed great ingenuity 
in conserving diplomatic honor while trying to accomplish a 
meaningful goal: internal and external peace, and reform in
Mexico, As the weeks passed, the mediators lessened their 
expectation. Finally they resorted to protocols pointing out 
goals and means to these goals leaving actual implementation 
to Wilson, Carranza, and Huerta. The mid-June deadlock led 
many observers to offer their advice. The Independent
suggested that Wilson, Huerta, and Carranza allow the 
mediators to become binding arbitrators in the selection of a 
provisional president. If the United States threw its
complete backing to this government, neither Carranza nor 
Huerta could not dislodge it. Others, including the New York
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Times, counseled patience: either Villa or Carranza would
1reach Mexico City and solve the whole problem militarily.
The mediators had hoped to solve in part the question
of Constitutibnalist representation, Carranza’s agents at
Buffalo entered , into discussions with the United States
delegation. -These talks covered the internal issues of land
reform and the provisional president. The dual conference
idea also bypassed the armistice required by the mediators.
Since the Constitutionalists did not actually attend the
Niagara conference, the mediators took no official notice of
2their presence. Diplomatic protocol remained intact.
The illusion of diplomatic success quickly faded. On 16
June 1914, after a four-hour meeting in Buffalo, the American
delegates realized that Carranza absolutely refused to accept
mediation on Mexican internal affairs. No matter the
outcome, the Constitutionalists ’’would not accept as a gift
3anything which the Mediators could give them.” The Confer­
ence inspired no confidence in the carrancistas: "They felt
4the mediators had blundered, and that failure was certain.’’
1 Hamilton Holt, "Mediation Deadlock and the way out” , 
The Independent, Vol. 78, 1 June 1914, p. 344; "Moving Toward 
Peace in Mexico” , The Literary Digest, Vol. 49, 4 July 1914,
p. 6.
New York Times, 22 June 1914.
3 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 16 June 1914, 
File 812.00/23477, USDS, Foreign Relations, p. 538.
^ New York Times, 18 June 1914.
64
Subsequent meetings only reaffirmed carrancista insistence
5on Mexican self-determination,
While the American delegates met with failure at 
Buffalo, the mediators took a short break following the 
sessions on 17 June 1914. Da Gama and SuSrez Mujica occupied 
themselves with Conference paperwork and sightseeing. Naon 
journeyed to the Harvard and Yale commencement exercises, 
receiving honorary Ll.D. degrees at each. On his return 
trip, Na6n stopped at Washington to discuss the deadlock with 
Secretary of State Bryan and President Wilson. After several 
hours of discussion, Na6n emerged triumphant. Mediation 
would continue, covering only external problems.^
Upon reconvening on 20 June 1914, the mediators pressed
for a Veracruz evacuation timetable. Kaon proposed a United
States evacuation thirty days before the election set by the
provisional government. The United States disagreed, even
though both Huerta and Carranza refused to hold elections
while the Americans remained on Mexican soil. The American
delegates reasoned that United States responsibility to
protect European property precluded an early withdrawal. A
7Veracruz evacuation schedule seemed distant.
5 "Mediation at Niagara and After", Review of Reviews
(American), Vol. 50, July 1914, p. 34.
^ "Negotiations Prolonged” , The Independent, Vol. 78, 29
June 1914, p. 547; Commissioners to Secretary of State, 21
June 1914, File 812.00/23483, RDS, RG59, NA.
7 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 27 June 1914, 
File 812.00/23489, RDS, KG59, NA; Quirk, Honor, p. 161.
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To avoid another impasse, the United States suggested 
omitting from any protocol a clause referring to American 
withdrawal. For Conference records, the evacuation would be 
subject to negotiations between the United States and the 
provisional government, In a conciliatory gesture, the
United States refused any indemnity or salute, virtually 
repudiating the official cause for invading Veracruz. Since 
the United States requested no indemnity, neither Huerta nor
QCarranza felt obligated to fight the American forces.
The provisional presidency remained a problem. On 21
June 1914, Na6n announced a plan which might resolve the 
conflict: a face-to-face meeting between huertistas and
carrancistas in which a provisional government and internal 
reforms would top the agenda. Previously, Na6n had discussed 
the idea with the First Chief’s representatives in Washing­
ton, who assured him that the carrancistas would work with 
the huertistas. At Buffalo, Mexican Constitutionalist
representative Luis Cabrera ’’felt sure that the result of the
discussion between the Mexicans would be an agreement on
9Mexican internal affairs,” The mediators supported the
0 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 23 June 1914,
File 812.00/23486, EDS, RG59, NA; ’’The End at Niagara” , The 
Independent, Vol. 79, 13 July 1914, p. 55.
9 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 22 June 1914,
File 812.00/23485, EDS, RG59, NA,
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plan. It also adhered to earlier statements from President 
Wilson.^
A conference between the two Mexican factions held the 
key to the solution of many potential problems for the United 
States. Constitutionalist military successes placed govern­
mental power within the reach of Carranza and his followers, 
The impending resignation of Huerta confronted his supporters
with political ruin, thus realizing most of Wilson’s policy 
11obj ectives.
laon's plan shone as a panacea for the stalled Confei—
ence. The international conflict seemed resolved and the
internal issues appeared solvable. The mediators were even
willing to referee the meetings between the huertistas and
carrancistas if the First Chief wanted to send envoys. As
early as 22 June 1914, the mediators had sent Carranza a
message strongly recommending ' a face-to-face meeting. The
12State Department added its endorsement of this plan.
Carranza replied that he alone could not decide to 
negotiate with Huerta. When he began his fight against ’’the 
Usurper,” he issued the Plan de Guadalupe, indicating he 
would fight until Huerta was driven from power. To change
10 Eomulo laon to Foreign Minister, 21 June 1914, Link,
Papers, p. 199; New York Times, 21, 23 June 1914.
Holt, ’’Mediation Deadlock” , p. 544; New York Times,
26 June 1914.
12 Romulo Naon to Foreign Minister, 21 June 1914, Link,
Papers, 199; New York Times, 21 June 1914.
the plan required the consent of his generals. Furthermore, 
Carranza hoped to avoid dissension within the Constitution­
alists ranks. If he decided to deal with Huerta unilateral-
13ly, his own forces might mutiny.
The mediators had resolved the United States-Mexican
dispute as far as possible, They believed Carranza would
agree to a meeting with the huertistas. Only Carranza’s
response remained for complete success. After several days
of waiting the mediators decided to formalize the agreements,
14erroneously believing Carranza could, or would, agree.
In all, four protocols resulted from the Conference.
The protocols represented the minutes of each plenary 
15session. The first contained the minutes of the opening
16session, the goals, procedures, and addresses. It also
contained the United States’ abjection to Huerta’s represent­
atives being referred to as ’’representatives of the Mexican 
people.” The second protocol announced Huerta’s willingness 
to retire if that would aid the cause of peace. The third
13 Rafael Zubar&n to Carranza, 27 June 1914, Fabela, 
Documentos, p. 144; H. Percival Dodge to Secretary of State, 
3 July 1914, File 812.00/12411, USDS, Foreign Relations, 
p. 554.
14 Venustiano Carranza to Generals, 29 June 1914, 
Fabela, Document, os, p. 146.
15 Since at the informal meetings between the mediators 
and either the American or Mexican delegates no stenographer 
kept notes, the protocols represent the only official record 
of the conference proceedings.
"End at Niagara", The Independent, Vol. 79, 13 July
1914, p. 55.
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Conference protocol simply stated that the provisional
government ’’shall exercise governmental powers until the
inauguration of a constitutional president" and provided for
17immediate recognition, The mediators held the third
16plenary session ;Ln an effort to push mediation along,
The last protocol acknowledged the plan for a conference 
between huertista and carrancista representatives to select a 
provisional government. The United States would not claim 
any indemnity or any other international satisfaction that 
might have resulted from the Tampico and Veracruz affairs. 
The protocol noted that the provisional government would 
proclaim an absolute amnesty to foreigners for any political 
offenses during the civil war and negotiate an international 
commission to settle claims. Lastly, the mediating govern­
ments and the United States would recognize the provisional 
government.
Vith the international dispute seemingly resolved, all 
that remained was internal reforms. Huerta’s delegates
expressed their willingness to meet Carranza to address these 
problems, As soon as Carranza sent an affirmative reply all
17 "Mexican Protocol signed", The Independent, Vol. 79,
6 July 1914, p. 9.
1 s Secretary of State to Commissioners, 7 June 1914, 
File 812.00/23444, RDS, RG59, FA.
19 H, Percival Dodge to Secretary of State, 1 July 1914, 
File 812.00/12395, USDS, Foreign Relations, p. 550.
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would be happily settled. For the Niagara conference only
signing the protocols remained.
The United States delegation raised an interesting
problem regarding its signatures. Affirmation of the
protocols implied an agreement between the United States and
Huerta’s government, Justice Lamar pointed out the difficulty
involved in agreeing with someone whose very existence one
denied. The problem boiled down to the question of how to
20agree to the protocol without implying recognition.
The United States delegates refused to sign the proto­
cols until they received a clarification from the State 
Department. Na6n and the other mediators took offense at the 
United States’ hesitancy to sign. Once the American dele­
gates explained the difficulties, the ABC envoys seemed to
21understand, although they pushed for a solution.
At last Secretary of State Bryan informed Lamar and 
Lehmann that the "president directs them to sign the min­
utes," stipulating that "they do so with the express under­
standing thCatl nothing contained therein is to be construed
20 Secretary of State to Commissioners, 30 June 1914,
Link, Papers, p, 225\ Lamar to Secretary of State, 30 June
1914, Link, Papers, p. 241.
21 Commissioners to Secretary of State, 29 June 1914,
Link, Papers, p. 225; Secretary of State to Commissioners, 31 
May 1914, File 812.0023451, RDS, RG59, NA; Commissioners to 
Secretary of State, 30 June 1914, File 812.00/23491, RDS, 
RG59, NA; J.R. Lamar to Secretary of State, 1 July 1914, 
Link, Papers, p. 241; Commissioners to Secretary of State, 1 
July 1914, File 812.00/23492, RDS, RG59, NA.
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22as a recognition of the [Huerta] government.” Vith that
proviso, to the general relief of all, the United States 
delegates signed the protocols. The protocols signed, only 
Carranza’s reply remained. The mediators, feeling their job 
to be finished, adjourned the Niagara conference on 2 July 
1914.23
At the farewell luncheon, Ambassador Da Gama stated that
’’the essential points of our program— that dealing with the
international phase of the conflict— is practically set-
24tied.” Unfortunately for the complete success of the con­
ference, the international questions could' be all that
mediation dealt with Carranza’s generals replied negatively 
to dealing with Huerta. They replied that they would rather 
continue the war. Moreover, Carranza informed Washington
that the desired reforms could not come from a provisional 
government. Only through the strength of an informal
military government could any real progress be made toward
25internal reforms.
■?2“ Secretary of State to Commissioners, 1 July 1914, 
EDS, RG59, NA.
23 Few York Times, 3 July 1914.
24 James L. Slayden, "The ABC Mediation” , The American
Journal of International Law, 1914, p. 150,
25 Robert F. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915: 
Convent ion of Aquascalientes {Bloomington: Indiana Univer­
sity Press, 1960), p, 46, hereafter referred to as Quirk,
Revolution, page number; New York Times, 2 June 1914; Leon 
Canova to Secretary of State, 6 July 1914, File 812,00/12429, 
USDS, Foreign Relations, p. 558; Philip C, Hana to Secretary 
of State, 9 July 1914, File 812.00/12449, USDS, Foreign
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Although Carranza refused to meet Huerta's representati­
ves, Huerta tried to comply with the protocols as far as 
possible. On 10 July 1914, Cardoso de Oliveira reported that 
the Mexican Congress had read and approved the protocols. 
Later that day, Huerta appointed Francisco Carbajal to the
position of Foreign Affairs' Minister. Five days later,
26Huerta resigned, giving Carbajal the presidency.
After an interview with Carbajal, Oliveira informed the 
State Department that the new government was disposed to make 
arrangements with the Constitutionalists. Carbajal hoped to 
hold talks in Niagara, using the ABC mediators and the 
Mexican delegates already there. On communicating Carba­
jal’s offer to the First Chief, Secretary of State Bryan 
found that Carranza would meet with Carbajal’s representa­
tives but suggested a conference in Saltillo, Coahuila,
Relations, p. 560; General Candida Aquilar to Venustiano 
Carranza, 4 July 1914, Fabela, Documentos, p. 155; John 
R. Silliman to Secretary of State, 10 July 1914, Fabela, 
Documentos, p. 168; Venustiano Carranza to Luis Eulalio, Luis 
Gutierrez, and Marrano Anieta, 13 July 1914, Fabela, Documen­
tos, p. 175,
^  Cardoso de Oliveira to Secretary of State, 15 July 
1914, File 812,00/12497, USDS, Foreign Relations, p, 563; 
"Support the Mediators", The Independent, Vol. 78, 15 June
1914, p* 472; "Mediation at Niagara and After", Review of 
Reviews (Americans), Vol. 50, July 1914, p. 36; Roberto 
Esteva Ruiz to Ignacio Alcocer, 17 June 1914, Fabela, 
Documentos, p. 122.
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instead of Niagara. Carranza also offered to suspend
27military operations during the talks.
On 27 July 1914, Carbajal appointed General Lauro Villar 
and Lie. David Gutierrez Allende to meet with Carranza. 
Although Carranza dealt more flexibly with the Carbajal 
government, he would not stop his march on Mexico City unless 
Carbajal unconditionally surrendered. With federal forces in 
disarray, Carbajal had little choice but to capitulate. On 
15 August 1914, Constitutionalist forces under Alvaro Obregon 
entered Mexico City.^®
Even after Carranza and his Constitutionalists control­
led Mexico City, Wilson experienced difficulties with the 
Mexican government. Wilson decided to leave United States 
forces at Veracruz until after an election. Wilson demanded 
guarantees against reprisals against the Veracruz population 
who had aided the American occupation forces. Carranza had 
previously declared that no election would be held while the
United States occupied Veracruz. Again, it appeared the
29United States and Mexico had reached an impasse.
27 Cardoso de Oliveira to Secretary of State, 10 July
1914, File 812,00/12464, USDS, Foreign Relations, p. 561; 
Cardoso de Oliveira to Secretary of State, 16 July 1914, File 
812.00/12516, RDS, RG59, NA; Secretary of State to Cardoso de 
Oliveira, 20 July 1914, File 812.00/12552, USDS, Foreign
Relations, p. 566, Link, Progressive Era, p. 128.
23 Quirk, Revolution, p. 50-54; Secretary of State to 
Si 1liman, 27 July 1914, File 812.00/12612, USDS, Foreign
Relations, p. 572,
29 "Mexican Protocol signed” , The Independent, Vol. 79,
6 July 1914, p. 9.
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To resolve the diplomatic deadlock, Secretary of State
Bryan suggested a meeting of the major Mexican military
figures to select a provisional government. On 1 October
1914, a "Junta de Jefes” met at Aquascalientes. Bryan hoped
this Convention would reconcile the various revolutionaries.
After an initial showing of unity, earlier disagreementgs and
outright conflicts broke out anew. The Conventions split
over views on what course the revolution should take. At the
convention, Paulino Martinez, leader of the zapatista
delegation insulted 0breg6n and Carranza, claiming Zapata and
30Villa to be the real Revolutionary leaders.
Carranza's relationship with Villa had been strained 
previously. The two had disagreed about the Veracruz occupa­
tion. While Carranza protested the American action, Villa 
felt there to be no threat to Mexican sovereignty. Later, 
after the Battle of Zacatecas <20-23 June 1914), the Consti­
tutionalists were close to taking Mexico City. However,
because of a squabble between Carranza and Villa, Carranza
refused the coal Villa’s army needed to move into the
capital. This permitted Obregon to take Mexico City first
and fairly ruptured relations within constitutionalist
. 31ranks.
^  Quirk, Honor, p. 166-167.
31 Mark T. Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution, U,S.-~ 
Mexican Relations Under Wilson and Carranza, (Tucson: Uni­
versity of Arizona Press, 1977), p. 5-19.
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After this, the gulf between the two groups widened 
over revolutionary goals, Carranza had envisioned a 
political revolution,' focusing on universal suffrage and "no 
re-election,” while Villa and Zapata concentrated mainly on 
social issues. This divergence ended any possible concilia-, 
tion as the junta chose Eulalia Gutierrez as its candidate, 
Carranza could not abide by the selection and withdrew with 
his supporters, while Villa supported Gutierrez. Mexico 
again geared for war, this time between Carranza and Villa.
Carranza then faced the same situation as had Huerta. 
He needed Veracruz to obtain arms and munitions to fight 
Villa in the north and Zapata in the south. In desperation, 
Carranza finally acceded to the guarantees Wilson demanded 
for evacuation. The U.S. military authority in Veracruz had 
done a remarkable job of updating accounting practices 
there. The customs house became much more profitable. The 
military government had saved the revenues to be turned over 
to whichever Mexican government the port would go to. 
Carranza needed this money. Also, as 1914 progressed, Wilson 
turned his attention from Mexico to war-torn Europe, In the 
light of the First World War, Mexico’s problems seemed 
minor. Finally on 23 November 1914, the United States 
evacuated Veracruz, leaving carrancista General Candida 
Aquilar in charge.
Later at the two battles of Celaya, April 1915, carran- 
cista forces under Alvaro Obregon routed Villa, giving
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32Carranza predominant power, Although Carranza now led
Mexico, the United States refrained from recognizing the 
Constitutionalist regime. Vilson desired a fulfillment of 
promised internal reforms.
Although Mexico had not instituted all the reforms the 
United States desired, Wilson granted Carranza recognition in 
October 1915. Carranza had effective control over key areas 
of Mexico. While Zapata would not be assassinated by
carrancista Colonel Jesds Guajardo until 1919, Villa had been 
reduced to the status of a regional leader. Further, even if 
Wilson and Carranza did not agree on Mexico’s needs, they 
agreed on Huerta’s villainy. This shared view provided a
basic understanding between the two, Consequently, when the
ABC powers joined by Guatemala, Bolivia, and Uruguay soli­
cited American acknowledgement of Carranza, Wilson granted 
33recognition.
32 ’’Mediation at Niagara and After” , Review of Reviews 
(American), Vol. 50, July 1914, p. 35; Quirk, Honor, p. 159.
33 Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the 
United States, third edition (New York; Henry Holt and
Company, 1950), p. 551; Quirk, Honor, p. 169.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
When Dominico Da Gama adjourned the Conference, the 
mediators left Niagara on a hopeful note. They believed that 
the ABC alliance had passed its trial by fire, proving itself 
to be a helpful, stabilizing force in spreading democracy and 
peace throughout the hemisphere. The foreign press, espe­
cially in Latin America, generally praised the Conference for 
the long-awaited cooperation between the United States and 
the rest of Latin America. If Huerta, Wilson, and Carranza 
had fulfilled their parts of the protocols, Mexico would have 
seen respite from the Revolution, and a provisional president 
would have been peacefully elected and entrusted with the 
task of implementing reforms and negotiating the United 
States out of Veracruz.
Yet none of these positive results lasted more than
»
temporarily. The ABC powers could not enforce the protocols, 
and neither Carranza nor Wilson felt obligated to abide by 
them anyway. Internal concerns, finally, dictated the degree 
to which the disputants abided by any Conference protocol.
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Futhermore, World War I even brought an end to the ABC
entente. Although later actions validated the Conference
goals— a stable Mexican government, social reform, and
U.S. withdrawal all occurred— these were not in any way
related to the Conference. Neither the mediators nor Wilson
knew Mexican conditions well enough to see that their efforts
were futile from the start. Ultimately, the Conference only
attested to the contradiction inherent in dictating ideals of
peace, liberty, and reform to another society.
The Conference appeared particularly popular with the
Argentines. Ambassador Na6n called it a "demonstration of
1Pan-American solidarity.” His superior, Foreign Minister
Eduardo Muratura, considered it the best hope for the future
of Inter-American policy. The United States, in accepting
mediation, seemed to place itself on par with the rest of the
Western Hemisphere, Another observer believed the Conference
ended Latin American political tutelage. The . .great
result of the ABC mediation, Cwas] South American assumption
of her share in the responsibilities and development of the
2Monroe Doctrine." Colonel Edward Mandell House, an in­
fluential Wilson foreign policy advisor, suggested to the 
president that a continentalization of the Doctrine would
1 Thomas F. McGann, Argentina, The United States, and 
the InterAmerican System; 1880-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1957), p. 309.
2 Charles H. Sherril, "Practical Mediation and interna­
tional peace” , North American Review, Vol. 200, December- 
1914, p. 891.
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improve relations in Latin America. The ABC conference
fulfilled the requirement to achieve this end and, in the
process, rejuvenated the Doctrine. A continentalization
could easily evolve into a "Concert of America” or "a High
Court of Public Opinion for the Western Hemisphere.” The ABC
protocols appeared to sponsor a closer relationship between
3the United States and the Latin American nations.
Foreign news services praised the Conference. Even the
Argentine press, generally very critical of United States
activities, spoke highly of the mediation. The Buenos Aires
daily, La Frensa, hailed the Niagara Conference as the first
occasion of the United States subordinating it interests to
those of the other nations in the hemisphere. The London
Times also noted the importance of the conference to inter-
American relations. "President Wilson’s acceptance of
mediation tendted] to allay the alarms and misgivings in
4reference to imperialism...” After the United States
accepted mediation, a friendlier tone marked the comment of 
South American press. As one Colombian diplomat noted in an 
Argentine journal, "Twenty years earlier the Latin American 
countries would not have dreamed of offering mediation to the 
United States, nor the United States of accepting it.” Prior 
to the Conference Latin America feared the United States as
^ Ibid, p. 887; "Doubts about Mexican Mediation", The 
Literary Digest, Vol. 48, 30 May 1914, p. 1305.
4 "Mediation in Mexico— A poll of the foreign press", 
Outlook, Vol. 107, 9 May 1914, p. 6 6 .
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an imperialistic superior. Equal participation in the
5ABC Conference helped allay such perceptions.
Of the topics covered, United States’ evacuation of 
Veracruz proved the major external Conference objective, 
While in the protocols appearances led observers to believe 
the United States would soon evacuate, Wilson desired 
leverage against the Carranza government. Carranza required 
the port for logistical reasons since he faced Villa’s 
internal rebellion. Also, he needed the port revenues to 
back Constitutionalist currency and stabilize the regime 
economically. Carranza had to accede to Wilson’s conditions 
before the United States agreed to withdraw. The United 
States could not remain indefinitely in Veracruz, yet 
mediation failed to dislodge the occupational force. United 
States forces remained in Veracruz until 23 November 1914. 
Only after Carranza guaranteed the safety of the Veracruz 
population did Wilson permit evacuation.^
Protocol enforcement posed the other major obstacle to 
Conference success. The mediating nations had no political 
or economic clout to compel the Mexicans or the United States 
to accept the settlements, Hence, although the protocols 
presented an answer, Carranza, Wilson, and Huerta felt no 
obligation to heed them.
5 McGann, I nter American System, p. 307; ’’Doubts about 
Mexican Mediation” , The Literary Difrest, Vol. 48, 30 May
1914, p. 1305.
^ Quirk, Honor, p. 161, 165.
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Unfortunately, all positive estimations of the Confer—  
ences erred. Even though the mediators believed the Confer­
ence had great potential for success, in a strictly practical 
sense it failed, The mediators failed to reckon with 
Mexican passions regarding social revolution and the person­
alities of Wilson and Carranza,
The divergent personalities involved proved the most
problematic point of the Conference. On the American side,
Wilson desired to control the Conference, He gave his
representatives little power; they had to refer all questions
and comments to the State Department and the White House.
Within the first week of the Conference, Wilson sent a
confidential memorandum to the mediators indicating his
intent to dictate the Conference results. His uncompromising
and manipulative attitude presented several roadblocks.
Rather than considering meaningful leadership qualities of
potential Mexican provisional presidents, delegates Lehmann
and Lamar sought information for the President on the
candidates' moral rectitude. Moreover. conflicts over
7phraseology inhibited diplomatic understanding.
On the Mexican side, Carranza’s suspicion of the 
Conference aggravated the negotiations. His refusal to treat 
peacefully with Huerta and his rightful negation of internal 
topics as appropriate mediation material hindered any real 
progress. The mediators could not address adequately the
7 Cline, U.S. and Mexico, p. 162.
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entire Mexican issue 1 without participation of the major 
Mexican parties. Without carrancista participation, Huerta
Oseemed more vulnerable.
With the Conference’s failure to provide a lasting 
solution to the Mexican problems, a stronger hemispheric 
relationship seemed the only positive result. However even 
the unity sponsored by the ABC mediation proved brief. For 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the Conference provided a 
cement for entente. Yet in 1917, Brazil separated itself 
from the entente by joining the United States in declaring 
war on the central powers while Argentina and Chile remained 
neutral. Afterwards the alliance never regrouped. Nor did 
the heralded cooperation ever quite materialize into a 
’’concert of America.” At best the conference proved little 
more than a precursor of later policies like the Good 
Neighbor Policy and the Alliance for Progress, both of 
which focused on cooperation.®
While the Conference provided answers to the matters 
they addressed, none of the planks in the protocols was 
implemented. The mediators considered many laudable ideas, 
but they could not force a meeting between the two Mexican 
factions or impose U.S. evacuation of Veracruz. Wilson and
Q
Quirk, Revolution, p. 50.
9 ’’Pan American diplomacy superseding the Monroe 
Doctrine” , Current Opinion, Vol. 57, August 1914, p. 85; 
George Hill, ’’Four days of the Niagara Peace Conference” , The 
Independent, Vol. 78, 1 June 1914, p.' 344.
32
the mediators desired Mexico to implement positive reforms in 
several areas. They considered political reconstruct ion very 
important, wanting to prevent another dictatorship like that 
of Porfirio Diaz. One attraction of Madero’s revolutionary 
platform forbade presidential re-election. Wilson especially 
sought the establishment of democratic institutions in 
Mexico. He believed that if Mexico adopted these institu­
tions, it could then follow the United States’ lead in 
progressive self-determination. This self-determination 
would help solve the social problems which had fostered the 
Revolution. The conference, in part, concerned itself with
creating a government impervious to the kind of dictatorial
10manipulations that Mexico had seen under the Diaz regime.
The Diaz dictatorship had forced progress on Mexico, 
particularly in extractive industries and railroad trans­
portation. However, the lower classes and the Indians reaped 
few or no rewards from these advances. His program featured 
centralized authority and extensive industrialization of 
Mexican extractive sectors. Since Mexico lacked sufficient 
capital, Diaz offered enticements to foreign investors. 
These concessions included overlooking numerous infractions 
of working codes and allowing abuse of native labor.
Despite the hardships imposed by the Diaz regime, Mexico 
faced greater hardships at the time of the Conference than
10 Arthur S. Link, Vilson the Diplomat: a look at his
major foreign policies (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press,
1957), p. 22-23.
before the Revolution. The initial war mobilization brought 
destruction of. foreign properties by vengeful Mexicans. 
Crops went , unattended and industries languished. By '1914, 
war. had destroyed much of Mexico’s economic infrastructure.
The ABC mediators recognized these problems and tried to 
supply meaningful answers. Agrarian reform and education to 
improve land productivity figured prominently in the media­
tor’s concerns. They urged peaceful reform rather than
11continued bloody war.
Ironically, most of the internal reforms suggested by
the Conference found later implementation. The Mexican
Constitutional Assembly wrote the Queretaro Constitution of
1917 to reform the political system. To prevent another
thirty-year dictatorship, a no-reelection clause appeared.
The Constitution spoke of democratic goals and ideals to make
Mexican government more representative and responsive to
Mexican citizenry. The Conference, at best, only pointed out
12problem areas for later improvements.
Even prior to the 1917 Constitutional Convention,
Carranza issued his addit ions to ease immediate social
problems. These decrees focused on particular problems like 
the 1915 ’’Law of restoration and donation of Ej idos, ” This 
legislation pressed for agrarian reform, attempting to
Slayden, "ABC Mediation” , p. 150.
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restore tribal land to various Indian groups. As time
13passed, more legislation tried to lessen social inequities.
The mediators and observers believed the conference 
could succeed because they had honestly tried to deal with 
Mexico’s problems. The mediators, however, simply did not 
understand the situation in Mexico. For the Conference, the 
foremost problem consisted of Carranza’s armistice refusal. 
The mediators refused to consider any negotiation without 
cessation of hostilities. Carranza desired total power, 
something the mediators would not grant. The First Chief 
preferred finding answers on the battlefield, not in the 
conference room. The mediators could not realize that the 
Mexican situation demanded a strong leader, the kind of 
leadership which could only be provided by military 
strength.
Consequently, the mediators themselves set up the real 
obstacles for any desirable settlement. Over the protesta­
tions of Carranza, they insisted on covering internal 
reforms, a usurpation of Mexican sovereignty. This undercut 
the growing spirit of mexicanidad, or Mexican nationalism, a 
by-product of the Revolution. Futhermore, the mediators had 
little knowledge of conditions in Mexico at the time. Only 
seventy-year-oId Su&rez Mujica had officially served there, 
and his memory left much to be desired. The mediators’
13 Cline, U.S. and Mexico, p. 165.
inflexibility truly hurt the Conference’s chances for 
success.
Fundamentally, the ABC conference demonstrates many 
characteristics of Wilsonian policy. The President truly 
believed that if democratic institutions could be trans­
planted from the United States, the Mexicans would create a 
stable, fair government. Wilson did not consider the masses 
of illiterate Mexicans, many of whom did not even speak 
Spanish. Although he considered the economic gulf between 
rich and poor, he did not assess from consular reports the 
social unrest which in part gave rise to the Revolution. In 
1914, no ’’primary and agrarian education program” could have
solved the difficulties. For all of Wilson’s positive
14goals and high ideals, he could not put them into practice.
Equally important, the Conference underscored a diplo­
matic dilemma for the United States. Wilson desired Mexico 
to have a good government, a democracy upholding the ideals 
of liberty, equality, and self-determination. Yet United 
States ideals and actions clashed. To force Mexico to be 
free, Wilsian tried to dictate his vision of democracy, 
disregarding Mexican realities. As one observer wryly 
commented, the conference seemed to change from the ABC 
nations being mediators with the United States and Huerta as 
disputants, to a United States mediation between Huerta and 
Carranza with the ABC envoys, being observers. The United
14 Quirk, Revolution, p. 48,
States took this role to comply with its ideals, in the 
process negating the very self-determination it stood for.
Throughout the Conference, the United States witnessed a 
conflict between actions and ideals. Wilson hoped to help
Mexico and the Mexican people achieve a better government. 
Moreover, he wanted to help the mediators choose the best 
course to solve Mexican problems and evacuate the United 
States forces from Veracruz. However, his actions, in 
keeping with United States’ self interest, only hindered an 
accord. The mediators and Wilson never realized that they 
had attempted to right an instance of U.S. intervention by an 
even greater and more direct form of intervention. Wilson 
and the mediators never saw the irony inherent in forcing a 
society to adopt foreign standards of political and social 
reform. The fundamental error of the whole ABC conference
consisted in the blatant attempt to usurp Mexican sovereignty.
15 Gregory Mason, "Mediation without Information” , 
Outlook, Vol. 107, 27 June 1914, p. 446.
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